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Abstract 
We examine the gains from globalization in the presence of firm heterogeneity and potential resource 
misallocation. We show theoretically that without distortions, bilateral and export liberalizations increase 
aggregate welfare and productivity, while import liberalization has ambiguous effects. Resource 
misallocation can either amplify, dampen or reverse the gains from trade. Using model-consistent measures 
and unique new data on 14 European countries and 20 industries in 1998-2011, we empirically establish that 
exogenous shocks to export demand and import competition both generate large aggregate productivity 
gains. Guided by theory, we provide evidence consistent with these effects operating through reallocations 
across firms in the presence of distortions: (i) Both export and import expansion increase average firm 
productivity, but the former also shifts activity towards more productive firms, while the latter acts in reverse. 
(ii) Both export and import exposure raise the productivity threshold for survival, but this cut-off is not a 
sufficient statistic for aggregate productivity. (iii) Efficient institutions, factor and product markets amplify 
the gains from import competition but dampen those from export access. 
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1 Introduction
World trade has grown faster than world GDP since the early 1970s, and it expanded twice as quickly
between 1985 and 2007.1 Of great policy interest is how globalization a¤ects aggregate productivity and
welfare, and how its impact di¤ers across countries at di¤erent levels of economic development. In ad-
vanced economies, increased competition from low-wage countries has exacerbated public debates about
the gains from trade, amidst rising concerns about employment, inequality and Chinas dramatic expan-
sion. In developing countries, trade reforms have not always yielded all or only desired benets, leading
policymakers to question the merits of trade openness in the face of weak macroeconomic fundamentals
and slow structural transformation.
Trade theory provides a clear rationale for trade liberalization: it enables a more e¢ cient organiza-
tion of production across countries, sectors and rms, which generates aggregate productivity and welfare
gains. In particular, heterogeneous-rm models emphasize the importance of rm selection and reallo-
cation across rms in mediating these gains (e.g. Melitz 2003, Lileeva and Treer 2010). At the same
time, macroeconomics and growth research highlights that institutional and market frictions distort the
allocation of productive resources across rms and thereby reduce aggregate productivity (e.g. Hsieh and
Klenow 2009). However, how such frictions modify the gains from trade remains poorly understood.
This paper investigates the gains from globalization in the presence of rm heterogeneity and po-
tential resource misallocation. We rst show theoretically that without distortions, bilateral and export
liberalizations increase aggregate welfare and productivity, while import liberalization has ambiguous
e¤ects. Resource misallocation can either amplify, dampen or reverse the gains from trade. Using model-
consistent measures and unique new data on 14 European countries and 20 industries in 1998-2011, we
then empirically establish that exogenous shocks to export demand and import competition both gen-
erate large aggregate productivity gains. Guided by theory, we provide evidence consistent with these
e¤ects operating through reallocations across rms in the presence of distortions. First, we decompose
the aggregate productivity gains. Both export and import expansion increase average rm productivity,
but the former also shifts activity towards more productive rms, while the latter acts in reverse. Second,
both export and import exposure raise the productivity threshold for survival, but this cut-o¤ is not a
su¢ cient statistic for aggregate productivity. Finally, e¢ cient institutions, factor and product markets
amplify the gains from import competition but dampen those from export access.
Our rst contribution is theoretical. We examine the impact of trade liberalization and resource
misallocation in a standard heterogeneous-rm trade model, and numerically evaluate its predictions. In
the absence of misallocation, reductions in bilateral trade costs or unilateral export costs unambiguously
raise aggregate productivity and welfare, as in Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Redding (2014). On the
extensive margin, such reforms raise the productivity cut-o¤ above which domestic rms can operate. On
the intensive margin, they shift activity from less towards more productive rms. By contrast, unilateral
import reforms have ambiguous consequences because they increase market competitiveness both in the
1See Chapter 2 of the World Economic Outlook published by the International Monetary Fund in October 2016.
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liberalizing country and in its trade partner, with opposing e¤ects on the productivity cut-o¤ at home.
This results in welfare and productivity gains when wages are exible and Metzler-paradox losses when
wages are xed, as in Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2013) and Bagwell and Lee (2016).
Under resource misallocation, the impact of both bilateral and unilateral trade liberalization on
aggregate productivity and welfare becomes ambiguous. Moreover, it is not monotonic in the degree of
misallocation, such that distortions may amplify, dampen or reverse the gains from trade. In the model,
rms receive two exogenous draws, productivity ' and distortion . Distortions create a wedge between
social and private marginal costs of production, and generate an ine¢ cient allocation of productive
resources and market shares across rms that is based on distorted productivity ' = ' rather than true
productivity '. This misallocation arises only due to institutional imperfections that cause frictions in
the market for input factors (or equivalently, for output products), and is not driven by variable mark-
ups as in Dhingra and Morrow (2014). Globalization has ambiguous e¤ects because distorted economies
operate in a second-best world and trade reforms can worsen or improve allocative e¢ ciency.
Our second contribution is methodological. We demonstrate how key theoretical concepts map to
empirically observable variables and how theoretical mechanisms can be assessed with available data.
Firm productivity measured by real value-added per worker is monotonic in theoretical rm productivity
inclusive of any distortions, conditional on export status. However, welfare is generally not monotonic in
measured aggregate productivity, dened as the employment-weighted average productivity of domestic
rms. The two are proportional under exible wages, Pareto-distributed productivity, and no misalloca-
tion. They also co-move in a wide segment of the parameter space away from this special case, but only
when there are no distortions.
We decompose measured aggregate productivity into the unweighted average rm productivity and
the covariance of rms productivity and employment share, as in Olley and Pakes (1996). The OP
covariance is not a su¢ cient statistic for either the parameters governing the distribution of  or the
state-dependent level of allocative e¢ ciency. Numerical simulations indicate that the OP decomposition
is nevertheless informative: Trade reforms can move the two OP productivity components in opposite
directions only under misallocation.
Our third contribution is empirical. We assess the e¤ect of international trade on aggregate pro-
ductivity and the mechanisms through which it operates, using new data assembled by the Competitive
Research Network of the ECB for 14 European countries and 20 manufacturing industries in 1998-2011.
These data are unique in capturing not only aggregate outcomes, but also various moments of the un-
derlying distribution across rms. This makes it possible to implement the OP decomposition in a large
cross-country, cross-sector panel for the rst time.
Our baseline measures of export access and import competition are gross exports and gross imports
(less own-sector imported inputs) by country and sector, from the World Input-Output Database. We
establish causality with an IV strategy that exploits variation in the initial composition of countries
trade baskets and WIOD data on value-added trade ows by sector of nal use. We instrument for
export demand with the weighted average absorption across a countrys export destinations, by sector.
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We instrument for import supply with import tari¤s and the weighted average of value-added exports
for nal consumption across a countrys import origins, by sector.
We nd that export access and import penetration both signicantly increase measured aggregate
productivity. The estimates imply that a 20% rise in export demand and import competition would gen-
erate productivity gains of 7.6%-8.2% and 1%-10% respectively. We perform three exercises to uncover
the mechanisms driving these e¤ects. The results indicate that rm heterogeneity and resource misallo-
cation jointly determine the gains from trade. Moreover, distorted economies adjust asymmetrically to
positive shocks to domestic rms such as stronger export demand and negative shocks such as tougher
import competition.
First, the OP decomposition reveals that export growth both raises average rm productivity (61-
77%) and reallocates activity towards more productive rms (23-39%). By contrast, the gains from import
competition stem entirely from higher average rm productivity (117-136%) and are partly o¤set by a
shift in activity towards less productive rms (- 17-36%). Through the lens of the model, these patterns
can only be rationalized with trade inducing reallocations across rms in the presence of distortions.
Second, both export and import exposure increase the minimum productivity among active rms,
consistent with trade improving rm selection by triggering exit from the left tail of the distribution.
However, the productivity threshold is not a su¢ cient statistic for the e¤ect of trade on aggregate
productivity, counter to model predictions for the case of no misallocation.
Finally, e¢ cient institutions, factor and product markets amplify the productivity gains from import
competition and dampen those from export expansion. We measure broad institutional quality with
rule of law and corruption, and proxy institutional frictions in specic input and output markets with
indices of labor market exibility, creditor rightsprotection and product market regulation. This direct,
assumption-free evidence suggests that misallocation does moderate the impact of globalization, and
informs the theoretically ambiguous sign of this moderating force.
We contribute to several strands of literature. We advance research on the role of rm heterogeneity
for the gains from trade. Work-horse trade models emphasize the importance of reallocations across
heterogeneous rms for the realization of welfare and productivity gains from globalization (e.g. Arkolakis
et al. 2012, Melitz and Redding 2014). Prior empirical work has studied episodes of unilateral trade
reforms with micro-level data for a single country. For example, Bernard et al. (2006) show that following
a decline in trade barriers in the U.S., productivity grew in liberalized sectors both because the least
productive rms exited and because more productive rms expanded more. Pavcnik (2002) estimates
that about 2/3 of the aggregate productivity gains from trade reforms in Chile in the late 1970s can
be attributed to the OP covariance, while Harrison et al. (2013) conclude that trade liberalization in
India during 1990-2010 mostly improved the average productivity of surviving rms.2 To the best of our
2There is also evidence of adjustments within surviving rms in response to trade reforms, such as production technology
upgrading (Lileeva and Treer 2010, Bustos 2011, Bloom et al. 2016), product quality upgrading (Amiti and Koenings
2007, Amiti and Khandelwal 2013, Martin and Mejean 2014), reallocations across products (Bernard et al. 2011, Mayer et
al. 2014, Manova and Yu 2016), and product scope expansion (Goldberg et al. 2010, Khandelwal and Topalova 2013). Sep-
arately, Alfaro and Chen (2017) conclude that greater competition from multinational rms fosters productivity-enhancing
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knowledge, we provide the rst causal cross-country evidence for high- and middle-income countries that
at the same time informs the rm dimension and compares export and import access.
Our work also adds to a large literature on the implications of resource misallocation for aggregate
growth and productivity. A key nding is that frictions in input and output markets distort the allocation
of production resources across rms, lower aggregate productivity, and contribute to the large variation
in aggregate productivity across countries (e.g. Restuccia and Rogerson 2008, Hsieh and Klenow 2009,
Bartelsman et al. 2013, Hopenhayn 2014, Gopinath et al. 2015, Foster et al. 2008, Foster et al. 2016,
Baqee and Farhi 2019). Since di¤erent micro-foundations for misallocation have di¤erent implications
for measured cross-rm dispersion in productivity and marginal products of capital and labor, quan-
tifying misallocation in the data poses challenges. We demonstrate how these insights extend to and
generate rich additional e¤ects in an open economy, general-equilibrium trade model. We do not aim
to develop new misallocation measures, but instead study observed aggregate productivity inclusive of
any distortions, as the policy-relevant concept of e¤ective productivity. We characterize the disconnect
between welfare and measured aggregate productivity, theoretically analyze the gains from trade with
and without misallocation, and verify that the empirical evidence is consistent with model predictions
for the case of misallocation.3
Most directly, we contribute to vibrant research on the impact of institutional and market frictions
for international trade. This body of work departs from the traditional assumption in international
economics that resources are e¢ ciently and instantaneously reallocated across rms. Credit constraints
have been shown to disrupt export entry, various dimensions of import and export activity at the rm
level, and aggregate trade ows (e.g. Chor and Manova 2012, Manova 2013, Foley and Manova 2015),
while labor market frictions shape the allocation of workers across rms and the adjustment to trade
reforms (e.g. Helpman et al. 2010, Cuñat and Melitz 2012, Tombe 2015, Ruggieri 2018).
We extend this research by turning to the fundamental question of how resource misallocation a¤ects
the gains from trade. Our analysis implies that welfare results from workhorse quantiable gravity
trade models (Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare 2014, Donaldson 2015) no longer apply in the presence of
distortions due to weak institutions. This is consistent with the literature on trade reforms in developing
countries (Atkin and Khandelwal 2019) and work on the implications of intersectoral and interregional
misallocation with and without input-output linkages for the gains from trade (Swiecki 2017, Caliendo
et al. 2017, Hornbeck and Rotemberg 2019).
Our work relates to several studies that also focus on rm-level distortions. Bai et al. (2019) theoret-
ically examine how rm-specic taxes and subsidies on input suppliers can distort the operations of nal
producers. Their quantitative exercise with Chinese manufacturing data implies that this misallocation
results in TFP losses and lowers welfare gains following trade liberalization. Sandoz (2018) establishes
that access to cheaper imported inputs fosters aggregate productivity growth by improving resource al-
locative e¢ ciency, and o¤ers evidence for France. Bajgar (2016) shows that the gains from trade tend to
reallocations of activity among domestic rms.
3Burstein and Cravino (2015) explore the relationship between measured aggregate productivity, real GDP, real con-
sumption and gains from trade in the absence of misallocation.
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increase with revenue distortions to domestic sales only, to fall with distortions to exports only, and to
become ambiguous with both distortions. Chung (2018) demonstrates how revenue subsidies and taxes
that may di¤er for domestic and export sales inuence the observed dispersion in rm productivity and
the gains from trade, and provides evidence for China. Khandelwal et al. (2013) nd that the ine¢ cient
allocation of quota rights across producers a¤ected Chinese export activity under the Multi-Fiber Agree-
ment, while Ben Yahmed and Dougherty (2017) show that the impact of import competition on rm
productivity depends on the degree of product market regulation.4 Even without frictions in input and
output markets, variable mark-ups that are absent from our framework entail market share misallocation
across rms and limit the pro-competitive gains from trade (Epifani and Gancia 2011, Edmond et al.
2015, Dhingra and Morrow 2016, Feenstra and Weinstein 2017, Arkolakis et al. 2019).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 theoretically and numerically examines
the impact of globalization on welfare and aggregate productivity. Section 3 introduces the CompNet
and WIOD data, and Section 4 presents baseline OLS estimates. Section 5 develops the IV estimation
strategy, reports the main IV results, and performs extensive sensitivity analysis. Section 6 explores the
mechanisms that mediate the productivity e¤ects of trade. The last section concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We examine the impact of international trade on aggregate welfare and productivity in a general-
equilibrium model with rm heterogeneity in productivity as in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008) and
potential resource misallocation as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Bartelsman et al (2013). Our goal is
threefold. First, we highlight that in the absence of misallocation, bilateral and unilateral export liberal-
izations always raise aggregate welfare and productivity, while unilateral import liberalization can have
ambiguous e¤ects. Second, we show that all three types of globalization have ambiguous consequences
in the presence of misallocation. Third, we characterize the relationship between welfare and aggregate
productivity in the model and aggregate productivity measures in the data to provide a bridge between
theory and empirics. We relegate detailed proofs to Appendix A.
2.1 Set Up
Economic environment: Consider a world with two potentially asymmetric countries i = 1; 2 and
free rm entry into production.5 In each country, a measure Li of consumers inelastically supply a unit
of labor, and aggregate expenditure is Ei. A representative consumer derives utility Ui from consuming
4Ding et al. (2016) show that import competition reduces observed productivity dispersion in China, consistent with
improved allocative e¢ ciency under certain modeling assumptions (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow 2009).
5The model can be easily extended to a world with N asymmetric countries. In the global equilibrium, the equilibrium
conditions below would hold for each country. From the perspective of country i, the impact of import or export liberalization
in i that is symmetric with respect to all other countries would be independent of N ; the impact of bilateral reforms with
trade partner j would be qualitatively the same but moderated by js relative market size.
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Demand qi(z) for variety z with price pi(z) in country i is thus qi(z) = EiP  1iQ pi(z)
 , where Ei is






is the ideal price index in the
di¤erentiated sector, and   1=(1  ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties.
The homogeneous good is freely tradeable and produced under CRS technology that converts one
unit of labor into one unit of output. When  is su¢ ciently low, both countries produce the homogeneous
good, such that it serves as the numeraire, PiH = 1, and xes wages to unity, wi = 1. We will refer to
this case simply as  < 1. When  = 1 by contrast, only di¤erentiated goods are consumed, and wages
are endogenously determined in equilibrium. The aggregate consumer price index is thus Pi = P

iQ.
In each country, a continuum of monopolistically competitive rms produce horizontally di¤erentiated
varieties that they can sell at home and potentially export. Firms pay a sunk entry cost wifEi and, should
they commence production, xed operation costs wifii and constant marginal costs. Exporting from i
to j requires xed overhead costs wifij and iceberg trade costs such that  ij units of a good need to be
shipped for 1 unit to arrive, where  ii = 1 and  ij > 1 if i 6= j. We allow for  ij 6=  ji, and analyze
symmetric and asymmetric reductions in  ij to assess the impact of di¤erent trade reforms.
Firm productivity and resource misallocation: In the absence of misallocation, rms in
country i draw productivity ' upon entry from a known Pareto distribution Gi(') = 1  ('mi ='), where
 >    1 and 'mi > 0.6 This xes rmsconstant marginal cost to wi='. Under resource misallocation
on the other hand, rms draw both productivity ' and distortion  from a known joint distribution
Hi('; ). Firmsmarginal cost is now determined by their distorted productivity ' = ' and equals
wi=' = wi=('). For comparability with the case of no misallocation, we assume that ' is Pareto
distributed with scale parameter 'm
i
and shape parameter .
Conceptually,  captures any distortion that creates a wedge between the social marginal cost of an
input bundle and the private marginal cost to the rm. Formally, this implies a rm-specic wedge in the
rst-order condition for prot maximization. Such a wedge may result from frictions in capital or labor
markets or from generally weak contractual institutions that support ine¢ cient practices like corruption
and nepotism.7 Distortions  will lead to deviations from the rst-best allocation of productive resources
across rms: If a rm can access "too much" labor "too cheaply", this would be equivalent to a subsidy
of  > 1. Conversely, capacity constraints, hiring and ring costs would correspond to a tax of  < 1.
Modeling misallocation in this way has several appealing features. First, it permits a transparent
comparison of rm and economy-wide outcomes with and without misallocation. Under misallocation,
rm selection, production and export activity depend on ' and  only through distorted productivity
6The assumption of Pareto-distributed rm productivity is motivated by empirical evidence and theoretical tractability.
We consider both Pareto and log-linear productivity distributions in the numerical exercise.
7Examples include the allocation of MFA export quota rights in China based on rmsstate ownership and political con-
nections, labor regulations that depend on rm size, and credit provision based on asymmetric creditor-borrower information,
personal or political connections (e.g. Khandelwal et al 2013, Midrigan and Zhu 2014, Brandt et al 2013).
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' = ', while optimal resource allocation in the rst best depends on ' alone. Thus two parameters
regulate the degree of misallocation: the dispersion of the distortion draw, , and the correlation between
the distortion and productivity draws, ('; ).8 Misallocation occurs if and only if  > 0, but its severity
need not vary monotonically in the    ('; ) space.9
Second, introducing distortions on the input side is qualitatively isomorphic to allowing for distortions
in output markets, such as rm-specic sales taxes.10 Our theoretical formulation thus ensures tractability
without loss of generality. In the empirical analysis, we correspondingly exploit di¤erent measures of
broad institutional quality, capital and labor market frictions, and product market regulations.
Within the di¤erentiated sector, misallocation stems from the ine¢ cient allocation of production
resources and consequently market shares across rms. Since CES preferences and monopolistic compe-
tition will imply a constant mark-up  = 1= > 1, there is no additional misallocation due to variable
mark-ups across rms as in Dhingra and Morrow (2016). When  < 1, however, there will also be mark-
up driven misallocation across sectors: Because perfectly competitive producers of the CRS homogeneous
good do not charge a mark-up, the di¤erentiated sector will be "too small".
2.2 Economy Equilibrium
Firm behavior: Producers choose their price pij(') and quantity qij(') to maximize prots ij (')
separately in each market j. With no distortions, the optimal behavior of a rm with productivity ' is:
max
p;q













lij(') = fij +
 ijqij(')
'















  wifij : (2.5)
where lij('), cij(') and rij (') are the employment, costs and revenues associated with sales in j.
Since prots are monotonically increasing in productivity, rms in country i sell in market j only if
their productivity exceeds threshold 'ij . The domestic and export cut-o¤s are implicitly dened by:
rii('

ii) = wifii; rij('

ij) = wifij . (2.6)
Upon entry, rms commence production if their productivity is above 'ii, and exit otherwise. We assume
as standard that the parameter space guarantees selection into exporting, 'ij > '

ii, for any  ij > 1.
8For example, with imperfect credit markets, lenders may base loan decisions on a noisy signal of rm productivity, such
that 0 < ('; ) < 1. Alternatively, if more productive rms optimally hire more skilled workers, labor market frictions may
be especially costly in the specialized market for skilled workers, such that ('; ) < 0.
9We consider numerical simulations for the case of joint log-normal distribution Gi('; ), which is fully characterized by
('; ) < 1 and . Higher-order moments may also matter under alternative distributional assumptions.
10For example, one can specify the distortion on the revenue side such that rm prots equal ij('; ) = pijqij   wilij .
While prots will now be proportional to '1= instead of ', and rm selection along the extensive margin will be adjusted
accordingly, the main intuitions and results in the baseline model with input distortions will remain valid.
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In the case of misallocation, the prot-maximization problem of a rm with distorted productivity
' = ' generates the following second-best outcomes:
max
p;q














lij('; ) = fij +
 ijqij('; )
'












; ij('; ) =
rij('; )

  wifij : (2.10)
While it would be socially optimal to allocate input factors and output sales based on true rm
productivity ', in the market equilibrium this allocation is instead pinned down by distorted productivity
'. Along the intensive margin, rms with low (high) distortions  produce and earn less (more) than in
the rst best, and set higher (lower) prices than e¢ cient. Along the extensive margin, a highly productive
rm might be forced to exit if it faces prohibitively high taxes, while a less productive rm might be
able to operate or export if it benets from especially high subsidies. Firms thus sell in the domestic and








) = wifii; rij('

ij
) = wifij . (2.11)
General equilibrium: The general equilibrium is characterized by conditions that ensure free
entry, labor market clearing, income-expenditure balance, and trade balance in each country.









where Ei[] is the expectation operator and I() is the indicator function.11
A key implication of the free-entry condition is that the productivity cut-o¤s in country i for produc-
tion and exporting must always move in opposite directions following trade reforms that a¤ect  ij or  ji.
Intuitively, any force that lowers 'ij tends to increase expected export prots conditional on production.
For free entry to continue to hold, 'ii must therefore rise, such that the probability of survival conditional
on entry falls and overall expected prots from entry remain unchanged.
Let LiH and LiQ denote respectively total labor employed in the homogeneous and di¤erentiated
sectors. Labor market clearing in country i requires:










whereMi is the mass of entering rms in the di¤erentiated sector. When  < 1, we restrict the parameter
space to ensure LiH > 0, such that the wage is determined by productivity in the homogenous-good sector.
When  = 1 and LiH = 0, by contrast, wages are exible and determined by Li = LiQ.






















In equilibrium, aggregate income must equal aggregate expenditure. With free entry, aggregate
corporate prots net of entry costs are 0, such that total income corresponds to the total wage bill.
Consumersutility maximization implies the following income-expenditure balance:12








Consider next the case of misallocation. The free entry and labor market clearing conditions are
analogous to those above after replacing productivity ' with distorted productivity ' = '. The
income-expenditure balance, however, has to be amended. While rm ('; ) incurs production costs













The gap c0ij('; )   cij('; ) is the social cost of distortionary rm-specic taxes or subsidies, which we
assume are covered through lump-sum taxation Ti of consumers in i. When a rm is subsidized and
cij('; ) < c
0
ij('; ) for example, it pays its employees less than what it would have without the subsidy,
















lij('; )I('  'ij)
i
; (2.16)













[c0ij('; )  cij('; )]I('  'ij)
i
: (2.18)
Welfare: Welfare in country i is given by real consumption per capita and can be expressed as:
Wi =
(
(1  )1  wiPii if  < 1
wi
Pi









Welfare is thus proportional to the real wage, wi=Pi, and the ratio of disposable income to gross income,
i. In the absence of misallocation, all income accrues to worker-consumers, such that Ei = wiLi and
i = 1. In the presence of misallocation, by contrast, some income is not available to consumers due to
the tax burden of distortions, such that Ei = wiLi   Ti and i < 1; albeit less realistic, it is in principle
possible that i > 1. Misallocation also a¤ects the price index Pi through distortions to rm selection
on the extensive margin and to rm prices and market shares on the intensive margin.
One can show that the real wage, and therefore also welfare, is a function of two equilibrium outcomes:
the (distorted) productivity cut-o¤ for production, 'ii or '

ii





















12When  = 1, general equilibrium requires an additional condition for balanced trade in the di¤erentiated-good sector
that links productivity thresholds and wages across countries:
X
i








13The exact expressions for Wi include an additional constant term:  when  = 1 and (1  )1  when  < 1.
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Lemma 1 Without misallocation, welfare increases with the domestic productivity cut-o¤, dWid'ii > 0.




> 0, and with the share of disposable income in gross income (holding '
ii
xed), @Wi@i > 0.
With e¢ cient resource allocation, a higher productivity cut-o¤'ii implies a shift in economic activity
towards more productive rms, which tends to lower the aggregate price index and increase consumers
real income. With misallocation, distortions a¤ect welfare through the reduction in disposable income i
and through the sub-optimal selection and size of active rms based on distorted productivity ' rather
than true productivity '. One direct implication of Lemma 1 is that welfare is proportional to the
domestic productivity cut-o¤ if and only if there are no allocative frictions. Another implication is that




Note that in the two-sector general equilibrium, welfare reects both distortion-driven misallocation
across rms within the di¤erentiated sector and markup-driven misallocation across sectors, both of
which are reected in the economy-wide price index Pi. One cannot analytically decompose these two
sources of misallocation, and their relative contribution is state-dependent.14
2.3 From Theory to Empirics
A key challenge in evaluating the gains from trade is that productivity and welfare are not directly
observable. Here we characterize the mapping between these theoretical objects and their empirical
counterparts. We focus on rm and aggregate productivity in the di¤erentiated sector, which are the
objects of interest in both the single- and two-sector models.
Theoretical vs. measured rm productivity: The theoretical concept of rm productivity
is quantity-based, while empirical measures are generally revenue-based. For our purposes, real value
added per worker is a valid proxy for e¤ective rm productivity inclusive of any distortions.
Without misallocation, observed value added and employment correspond respectively to total rm
revenues, ri(') =
P
j rij(')I('  'ij), and total labor hired, li(') =
P
j lij(')I('  'ij). Denoting
labor used towards xed costs as fi(') =
P
j fijI('  'ij) and normalizing by the price index in the
di¤erentiated industry PiQ = P
1=














One can show that without distortions, real value added per worker increases monotonically with theo-
retical rm productivity conditional on export status, 0i('j' < 'ij) > 0 and 0i('j'  'ij) > 0.15
14Of interest may be the impact of trade on aggregate welfare and productivity when there are distortions in the di¤eren-
tiated sector but a benevolent government can always neutralize the mark-up driven cross-sector misallocation. In theory,
this would present a complex dynamic problem and require state-dependent adjustment of the labor allocation across sectors
that is endogenous to trade reforms and that may violate labor market clearing. In practice, this would necessitate complete
information on policy makerspart and highly e¤ective policy levers. We leave these questions to future work.
15Sales-to-variable employment, ri(')=[li(')  fi(')], is invariant across rms because of constant mark-ups, but sales-to-
total employment, ri(')=li('), rises with ' because of economies of scale. Note the measured productivity of rm ' should
it not export exceeds its measured productivity should it export, rii(')=lii(') > ri(')=li('). This is due to a downward








In the case of misallocation, real value added per worker reects rmse¤ective productive capac-
ity given distortions, and can thus be labeled i('; ). It is now monotonic in theoretical distorted
productivity conditional on export status, 0i('j' < 'ij) > 0 and 
0















Measured aggregate productivity and OP decomposition: Let measured aggregate pro-















is rm 's share of aggregate employment.17
As an accounting identity, measured aggregate productivity, ~i, can be decomposed into the measured
unweighted average productivity across rms, i, and the measured covariance of rmsproductivity and
share of economic activity,
::
i, known as the OP gap (Olley and Pakes, 1996):


















The OP decomposition reveals how adjustments across and within rms shape aggregate measured
productivity. Changes in i reect two e¤ects of rm selection: exit/entry into production modies
the set of active rms, and exit/entry into production or exporting impacts measured rm productivity.
Changes in
::
i indicate reallocation of activity across rms with di¤erent productivity levels through
changes in their share of production resources and implicitly sales. The OP decomposition remains valid
in the case of misallocation, when ', '
ii
, i('; ), and Hi('; ) replace ', '

ii, i('), and Gi(') in (2.24).
Welfare vs. measured aggregate productivity: From a policy perspective, welfare and
domestic aggregate productivity matter for di¤erent objectives: The former captures consumer utility at
a point in time, while the latter indicates a countrys productive capacity, improvements in which drive
growth over time. However, these two objects can di¤er, even under allocative e¢ ciency: Welfare in
country i depends on the price index Pi faced by consumers in i, which reects the prices of all varieties
sold in i. Intuitively, Wi is related to the weighted average productivity of all domestic and foreign rms
supplying i, using their activity in i as weights. By contrast, ~i is the weighted average productivity of
domestic rms, using their total employment as weights. This distinction is irrelevant in special cases,
such as symmetric countries and bilateral trade costs, when the measure, productivity, prices and market
shares of rms exporting from i to j are identical to those of rms exporting from j to i.18
One can express measured aggregate productivity as a function of the real wage, wi=Pi, and the
16Note i(') and i('; ) depend on the real wage, and implicitly on the (distorted) productivity thresholds.
17 In the data, the rm weights are dened such that they sum to 1 across rms. Here, i(') is dened such that it
averages 1 across rms and the residual in the OP decomposition is the covariance of i(') and i(').
18Also, since i(') is monotonic in ' only conditional on export status, ~i need not be monotonic in e'i.
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rij('; )I('  'ij)
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Together, equations (2.19), (2.20) and (2.25) imply that shocks that move the (distorted) productivity
cut-o¤s for production and exporting will shift ~i through their e¤ect on the equilibrium wage wi (if
 = 1), the aggregate price index Pi, and the average distortion ~i. In particular:









Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that measured aggregate productivity can be a su¢ cient statistic for welfare
only without misallocation.19 With misallocation, Wi and ~i are not closed-form functions of the misal-
location parameters, and we therefore simulate the model using standard parameters from the literature
(see Section 2.5) to numerically explore their relationship. We assume productivity and distortions are
joint log-normal with ' =  = 1, ' = 1, and vary the levels of distortion dispersion  2 [0; 0:5] and
productivity-distortion correlation ('; ) 2 [ 0:4; 0:4].
Figure 1A shows that welfare peaks at  = ('; ) = 0 and falls as the distortion dispersion widens
for the given ('; ). At low levels of , Wi rises as the distortion and productivity draws become
more positively correlated, but the opposite holds at su¢ ciently high levels of . While measured
aggregate productivity behaves similarly under this parametrization in Figure 1B,Wi and ~i need not co-
move under alternative assumptions (unreported). For completeness, Figure 1C plots measured average
productivity i against the misallocation parameters.
OP covariance vs. misallocation: The OP covariance is related to allocative e¢ ciency in that
::
i > 0 in a frictionless economy (when both i(') and i(') conditionally increase in ') but
::
i ? 0 in
the presence of distortions.20 However, one cannot interpret a rise in
::
i as an improvement in allocative
e¢ ciency, because the optimal allocation of resources across rms is generally state-dependent and reliant
on the economic environment (i.e. demand structure, cost structure, market structure, productivity




i were known, both values below and above it would






ij need not be proportional
to or even monotonic in the degree of misallocation and the welfare loss associated with it.
19With free entry, ~i depends on the endogenous mass of rms, Mi. With no misallocation, Mi is a constant determined
by model parameters when productivity is Pareto distributed. The Pareto assumption is su¢ cient but not necessary for ~i
to be monotonic in Wi; numerical simulations indicate that Wi and ~i move in the same direction under other productivity
distributions and reasonable parameter values from the literature. With misallocation, the Pareto assumption for distorted
productivity gives tractability but no longer guarantees monotonicity.
20A su¢ cient condition for
::
i > 0 in the frictionless economy is that the average revenue productivity of exporters is
higher than the average revenue productivity of non-exporters, in line with prior evidence in the literature.
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Figure 1D illustrates that the OP covariance can indeed be negative, zero or positive at di¤erent
points in the    ('; ) space. Given ('; ), higher distortion dispersion is associated with lower
::
i, consistent with more productive rms becoming sub-optimally smaller. Given , higher ('; )
tends to imply lower
::
i; although productive rms get ine¢ ciently large, this counterintuitive pattern
reects distortion-induced measurement error in i('; ). This measurement error also explains why
::
i
does not peak at ('; ) = 0 if  > 0, when misallocation would intuitively be lowest. Alternative
parameterizations can also produce non-monotonic patterns for
::
i in  and ('; ).
Inspecting Figures 1A and 1D, the comparative statics for Wi and
::
i are not perfectly aligned, rein-
forcing the conclusion that
::
i does not fully capture the welfare cost of misallocation.21 One can therefore
not unambiguously interpret a rise (fall) in
::
i in response to an exogenous shock as an improvement
(deterioration) in allocative e¢ ciency.
In sum, we are not able to develop a model-based index of misallocation that would be observable
in the data and that would allow one to decompose measured aggregate productivity into potential
productivity and distortions. However, this is also not the goal of our exercise: We are interested in
the impact of globalization on e¤ective aggregate productivity inclusive of any distortions. As we show
below, our theoretical framework allows to predict and contrast this impact in environments with and
without misallocation. Indeed, the combined e¤ect of trade shocks on the three OP productivity terms
can reveal the presence of misallocation.
2.4 Trade Liberalization
We can now examine the impact of trade liberalization on welfare Wi and measured aggregate produc-
tivity ~i, average productivity i, and productivity covariance
::
i. We consider three forms of trade
liberalization: symmetric bilateral reduction in variable trade costs  ij and  ji, unilateral reduction in
export costs  ij , and unilateral reduction in import costs  ji.
2.4.1 E¢ cient allocation
In the case of e¢ cient resource allocation, rms respond to trade reforms based on their productivity.
Consider rst export liberalization. A fall in  ij creates more export opportunities for rms in
i, as they can charge lower prices in j and benet from higher export demand. This decreases the
productivity cut-o¤ for exporting 'ij , more rms commence exporting, and continuing exporters expand
sales abroad. For free entry in i to continue to hold, expected prots from domestic sales must fall, and
the productivity threshold for survival, 'ii, rises. This e¤ect is amplied when wages can exibly adjust,
as export expansion bids up labor demand and wages in i, such that even more low-productivity rms
are no longer protable.
Consider next import liberalization. A decline in  ji enables foreign rms to sell more cheaply to i.
This lowers the productivity cut-o¤ for exporting from j to i, 'ji, and induces continuing j exporters to
21Hsieh and Klenow (2009) nd that welfare is invariant with ('; ) in a closed-economy model. This invariance does
not hold in Figure 1A because we allow for free entry and ('; ) a¤ects rm selection along the extensive margin. Figure
1D is consistent with results Bartelsman et al. (2013).
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ship more to i. The direct e¤ect is tougher import competition in i, reducing the aggregate price index
and demand for locally produced varieties. This lessens domestic rmshome sales and pushes up is
domestic productivity cut-o¤, 'ii. The indirect e¤ect is a higher productivity threshold for survival in
j, 'jj , so that free entry still holds now that j rms expect higher export prots. This makes j a more
competitive market, raises the cut-o¤ for exporting from i to j, 'ij , and with free entry in i, acts to
depress the survival threshold, 'ii. When wages are exible, their fall dampens the indirect e¤ect and
the direct e¤ect dominates. Conversely, when wages are xed, the indirect e¤ect prevails.
A symmetric bilateral liberalization combines the impacts of unilateral export and import reforms.
One can show that this raises the domestic productivity cut-o¤, 'ii, regardless of wage exibility. This
is associated with the reallocation of activity across rms via the exit of low-productivity rms on the
extensive margin and the shift in market share towards more productive rms on the intensive margin.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, changes in the productivity threshold 'ii signal changes in aggregate outcomes.
Thus bilateral and unilateral export liberalizations unambiguously increase welfare Wi, as in Melitz
(2003), Melitz and Redding (2014), Arkolakis et al. (2012), and Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2013).
Unilateral import liberalizations raise welfare under exible wages, but generate welfare losses with xed
wages, as in Demidova (2008) and Bagwell and Lee (2016).22 We further establish that in the absence of
distortions, measured aggregate productivity ~i moves in the same direction as Wi.
Turning to the OP decomposition, it is clear that if globalization raises (lowers) ~i, then either
average productivity i, or the productivity covariance
::
i, or both must rise (fall) as well. However,
one cannot analytically sign the response of these OP terms without further parameter restrictions. This
ambiguity arises due to the counteracting e¤ects of the shift in activity towards more productive rms
and the di¤erential change in measured productivity i(') along the productivity distribution.
Proposition 1 Under no misallocation and exible wages ( = 1), bilateral and unilateral trade liber-
alizations (i.e. reductions in  ij,  ji, or both  ij and  ji) increase welfare Wi and measured aggregate
productivity ~i, but have ambiguous e¤ects on average productivity i and covariance
::
i.
Proposition 2 Under no misallocation and xed wages ( < 1), bilateral and unilateral export liberaliza-
tions (i.e. reductions in  ij or both  ij and  ji) increase welfare Wi and measured aggregate productivity
~i, but have ambiguous e¤ects on average productivity i and covariance
::
i. Unilateral import liberal-




In the presence of misallocation, economies operate in a sub-optimal equilibrium both before and after any
trade reforms. Trade liberalization now triggers reallocation across rms based on distorted productivity
' rather than true productivity '. While trade does not a¤ect the underlying institutions that generate
distortions (i.e.  and ('; )), it can in principle improve or worsen allocative e¢ ciency. From the
theory of the second best, it is therefore not possible to unambiguously determine the impact of trade
22The rise in the consumer price index after import liberalization with xed wages is known as the Metzler paradox.
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reforms on aggregate welfare and productivity: It hinges on initial state variables and model parameters,
in particular, the joint distribution Hi('; ).
The e¤ects of trade also need not be monotonic in the distortion parameters  and ('; ) or the
initial degree of misallocation. In other words, more severe market frictions may amplify, dampen or re-
verse the gains from globalization. On the one hand, countries with more e¢ cient resource allocation may
more e¤ectively adjust to trade reforms and reap greater productivity returns. On the other hand, such
countries are closer to the rst best to begin with, and may benet less from further trade liberalization.
Intuitively, misallocation acts by distorting rm selection on the extensive margin and rm market
shares on the intensive margin. Misallocation would reduce the gains from trade if more productive
rms cannot fully respond to growth opportunities, while less productive rms are not forced to exit. For
example, trade liberalization could magnify existing distortions if rms with ine¢ ciently abundant access
to inputs can expand their activity relatively more than rms with ine¢ ciently constrained resources
(e.g. if new loans are extended based on collateralizable tangible assets accumulated with past loans).
Conversely, misallocation may increase the gains from trade if trade has a cleansing e¤ect on the economy
and serves to reallocate activity towards truly more productive rms (e.g. new loans are granted based
on future protable opportunities).
Proposition 3 Under resource misallocation, bilateral and unilateral trade liberalizations (i.e. reduc-
tions in  ij,  ji, or both  ij and  ji) have ambiguous e¤ects on welfare Wi, measured aggregate produc-




We explore the impact of counterfactual trade reforms through numerical simulations, to inform both its
sign and magnitude. We consider 20% reductions in trade costs from initial values of  ij =  ji = 1:81 in
three scenarios: bilateral liberalization (shocks to both  ij and  ji), export liberalization (shock to  ij),
and import liberalization (shock to  ji).
We use model parameters from the literature (e.g. Burstein and Cravino 2015), and set the elasticity
of substitution to  = 3. We assume that both countries have a unit measure of consumers, Li = Lj = 1,
and symmetric xed costs of entry, production and exporting, fEi = f
E
j = 0:1, fii = fjj = 1:2, and
fij = fji = 1:75. In the case of no misallocation, we let productivity in both countries be distributed




, ' = 0,


















.We set ' =  = 0
and ' = 1 in both countries. We x  = 0:05 and  = 0 in Foreign, and consider varying degrees of
misallocation in Home in the range  2 f0; 0:05; 0:15g and  2 [ 0:5; 0:5].24
23We set  based on Head et al. (2014), whose estimate (   1)= = 0:779 implies  = (3  1)=0:779 = 2:567 when  = 3.
24 In unreported numerical exercises available on request, we consider the case of no distortions in Foreign and varying
degrees of misallocation in Home. The impact of trade liberalization in Home on Homes aggregate welfare and productivity
are qualitatively similar to the baseline with two distorted economies.
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Figure 2 visualizes the full set of results for xed wages; without loss of generality, we set the expen-
diture share of di¤erentiated goods to  = 0:7. Table 1 presents snapshots for both xed and exible
wages for the cases of no misallocation and misallocation with high distortion dispersion ( = 0:15) and
di¤erent productivity-distortion correlations ( 2 f 0:4; 0; 0:4g).
Three patterns stand out in Table 1. First, in the absence of misallocation, bilateral and unilateral
export liberalization increase welfare and measured aggregate productivity whether wages are exible or
not (Panels A and B). By contrast, unilateral import liberalization increases Wi and ~i when wages are
exible, but reduces both when wages are xed. This is consistent with Propositions 1 and 2.
Second, resource misallocation can amplify, dampen or reverse the welfare and productivity gains
from trade, and this e¤ect is not monotonic in the degree of misallocation, consistent with Proposition
3 (Panel C). With exible wages, the welfare and productivity gains from trade are either smaller or
only marginally higher with misallocation than without, and decrease smoothly with the correlation pa-
rameter . The e¤ects of globalization become more nuanced with xed wages. Bilateral and unilateral
export liberalizations now increase welfare strictly less with than without misallocation, but the gains are
non-monotonic in : they peak when distortions are close to orthogonal to productivity, but decline sig-
nicantly and can turn negative away from   0. At the same time, unilateral import liberalization can
reduce welfare more severely with misallocation than without when  << 0, but may conversely increase
welfare when  is su¢ ciently positive. As for productivity, trade liberalization generates less negative
or higher productivity gains at higher levels of . Once again, misallocation can enlarge, moderate or
overturn the productivity gains that obtain in the rst best.
Finally, the two components of aggregate productivity ~i - average productivity i and covariance
::
i - move in di¤erent directions only under misallocation. With no distortions, changes in i account for
75% of the change in ~i on average, while
::
i contributes 25%. With frictions, by contrast, it is possible
for ~i and i to both rise even while
::
i falls. Extensive numerical exercises indicate that this result
cannot obtain in the absence of misallocation under reasonable parameter assumptions. Overall, the
behavior of i and
::
i signals that reallocations across rms along both the extensive and the intensive
margins of activity are important in the adjustment to trade shocks.
To anticipate our empirical results, we use baseline IV estimates to compute the implied productivity
e¤ects of a 20% rise in export demand and import competition in Panel D. The empirical ndings are
qualitatively consistent with the last row of Panel C, i.e. misallocation with xed wages and  = 0:4.
The magnitudes are in line with the numerical calculations for exports and higher for imports.
2.6 Discussion
Two model features that allow us to transition to the empirical analysis. First, for expositional simplicity,
we have studied an economy with a single di¤erentiated-good sector. Intuitively, our main conclusions
would extend to a world with multiple symmetric di¤erentiated-good sectors k, where consumer utility
is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate across sector-specic CES consumption indices. The e¤ect of any shock on
aggregate productivity ~i now depends on the weighted average response of sector-level productivities
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~ik. A uniform trade cost reduction would a¤ect ~ik equally across sectors, while a disproportionately
bigger shock to sector k0 would change ~ik0 disproportionately more. This justies our estimation strategy
which exploits variation across countries, sectors and time for identication purposes.
Second, we have considered reductions to trade costs,  ij and  ji. The e¤ect of exogenous shocks
to foreign demand - such as a rise in foreign market size Lj or aggregate expenditure Ej - would be
qualitatively the same as the e¤ect of a fall in export costs,  ij . Likewise, the e¤ect of exogenous shocks
to foreign supply - such as a rise in the measure of foreign rms Mj or a shift in the foreign productivity
distribution Gj(') - would be similar to the e¤ect of a fall in import costs,  ji. This holds because all
of these shocks operate through and only through movements in homes (distorted) productivity cut-o¤s
for production and exporting. This justies our choice of instruments in the IV analysis.
3 Data
We empirically evaluate the impact of international trade on aggregate productivity using rich cross-
country, cross-sector panel data from two primary sources, CompNet and WIOD. This section describes
the key variables of interest and presents stylized facts about productivity and trade activity in the panel.
3.1 CompNet Productivity Data
We exploit unique new data on macroeconomic indicators for 20 NACE 2-digit manufacturing sectors
in 14 European countries over the 1998-2011 period from the CompNet Micro-Based Dataset.25 Two
features of the data make it unprecedented in detail and ideally suited to our analysis. First, it contains
not only aggregate measures at the country-sector-year level, but also multiple moments of the underlying
rm distribution in each country-sector-year cell. This includes for example means, standard deviations
and skewness of various rm characteristics, as well as moments of the joint distribution of several such
characteristics. The dataset is built from raw rm-level data that are independently collected in each
country and maintained by national statistical agencies and central banks. These raw data have been
standardized and consistently aggregated to the country-sector-year level as part of the Competitiveness
Research Network initiative of the European Central Bank and the European System of Central Banks.26
Second, CompNet includes productivity measures that map exactly to the Olley-Pakes (1996) decom-
position in Section 2.3 of aggregate productivity in country i, sector k and year t (~i  AggProdikt)
into unweighted average rm productivity (i  AvgProdikt) and the covariance of rm productivity
and share of economic activity (
::
i  CovProdikt). In particular, we examine rmslabor productivity
dened as log real value added per worker (i(') or i('; )), and weight rms by their employment
share (i(')) at the country-sector-year level.27In addition to being model-consistent, labor productivity
25The 14 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain. While CompNet covers all NACE 2-digit industries in the European classication, we restrict the
sample to 20 manufacturing industries with WIOD trade data (NACE-2 sectors 10 to 31 without sectors 12 (tobacco) and
19 (coke and rened petroleum)).
26See Lopez-Garcia et al. (2015) for details on the data methodology and structure.
27The empirical counterpart to the theoretical OP decomposition in equation (2.24) at the country-sector-year level is:
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has the added advantage that it is based on directly observable data, rather than on a TFPR residual
from production function that is subject to estimation bias.
In Section 2.3, we dened rm productivity as value added deated by the consumer price index
(CPI) in the di¤erentiated sector PiQ, which is equivalent to the aggregate CPI Pi adjusted for the
di¤erentiated sectors expenditure share , PiQ = P
1=
i . With multiple years and di¤erentiated sectors,
this would correspond to Pikt = P
1=k
it , which is not observed. As standard with productivity and
GDP data, CompNet deates rm value added by the Eurostat value-added producer price index by
country-sector-year, V APPIikt. Compared to Pikt, an advantage of V APPIikt is that it is consistent
with measured value added being net of producersinput purchases that are absent from our model. On
the other hand, the CPI aggregates the prices of both local and imported varieties, while the VAPPI
aggregates only domestic producersprices. In our empirical analysis, we therefore control for country-
year xed e¤ects that absorb Pit and sector-year xed e¤ects that absorb k.
Table 2 documents the variation in aggregate productivity across countries, sectors and years in the
panel. Additional statistics for the variation across sectors and years within countries appear in Appendix
Table 1. The sample contains 2,811 observations and is unbalanced because of di¤erent time coverage
across countries. Aggregate productivity averages 3.21 in the panel (standard deviation 1.13), with
the covariance term contributing 0.23 (7.2%) on average (standard deviation 0.22). There are sizable
di¤erences in the level and composition of AggProdikt across economies, with CovProdikt capturing only
1.4% in Austria and 2.5% in Germany but up to 25.9% in Lithuania and 33.3% in Hungary. Moreover,
the standard deviations of AggProdikt and CovProdikt across sectors and years within a country reach
0.56 and 0.17 on average, respectively. Thus economy-wide productivity could be signicantly lower if
labor were randomly re-assigned across rms.
Table 2 also provides summary statistics for aggregate productivity growth at 1-, 3- and 5-year
horizons. Figure 3 shows that reallocations across rms can account for a substantial share of aggregate
growth, as was the case for Austria, Italy, Hungary and Lithuania before the 2008-2009 global crisis.
3.2 WIOD Trade Data
We use data on international trade activity from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD).28 While
standard trade statistics report gross ows by exporter, importer and traded sector, WIOD exploits
country-specic input-output tables to infer bilateral value-added ows by both traded sector and sector
of nal use. In particular, it provides the gross sales from input sector k in origin country i to output
sector s in destination country j in year t, Xijkst, as well as the value added by i that is embedded in
these sales, V AXijkst. Input sectors are in the NACE 2-digit classication, while output sectors comprise



















28See Timmer et al. (2015) for details on the data methodology and structure.
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dollars, which we convert to euros using annual exchange rates. Although WIOD relies on proportionality
assumptions to allocate input use across countries and sectors, it is the rst data of its kind and has been
used in path-breaking studies of global value chains (e.g. Bems and Johnson 2017).
Our baseline measure of export demand for exporting country i in sector k and year t, ExpDemandikt,
is the log value of is gross exports in sector k. We do not distinguish between exports used for nal
consumption and downstream production since both represent foreign demand from the perspective of i.
Our baseline measure of import competition in importing country i, sector k and year t, ImpCompikt, is
the log of the value of is imports in sector k, less the value of sector k imports used by i in the production
of sector k goods. We do not remove sector k imports used in i by producers in other sectors since such










Table 2 presents summary statistics for ExpDemandikt and ImpCompikt in the matched sample with
WIOD and CompNet data. ExpDemandikt averages 7.65 in the panel, with a standard deviation of 1.74.
The corresponding mean and dispersion for ImpCompikt are 6.41 and 1.97, respectively. We summarize
individual countriestrade exposure in Appendix Table 1, and plot its evolution over time in Figure 4.
While all countries experienced steady import and export expansion before the 2008-2009 nancial crisis,
they saw a sharp contraction in 2009 before regaining some ground by 2011 (Figure 4A). Although EU-
15 and new EU members display broadly comparable import trends, the latter saw dramatically faster
export growth during the sample period (Figures 4B and 4C).
4 Trade and Aggregate Productivity: OLS Correlation
We empirically assess the aggregate productivity e¤ects of international trade in three steps. In this sec-
tion, we rst provide OLS evidence that countriesobserved export and import activity, ExpDemandikt
and ImpCompikt, is systematically correlated with their aggregate productivity. Since observed trade
ows capture aggregate supply and demand conditions in general equilibrium, however, ExpDemandikt
confounds exogenous foreign demand for the products of country i with is endogenous export supply.
Analogously, ImpCompikt reects both the exogenous supply of foreign products to country i and is
endogenous import demand. In order to identify the causal e¤ects of globalization, in Section 5 we pur-
sue an IV-2SLS estimation strategy to isolate the exogenous components of export demand and import
competition. Finally, in Section 6 we perform additional analyses to inform the mechanisms through
which export demand and import competition operate.
4.1 OLS Specication
We explore the link between trade and aggregate productivity with the following OLS specication:
Yikt = + EX ExpDemandikt + IM ImpCompikt +  Zikt +  it + "ikt. (4.1)
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Here Yikt refers to aggregate productivity in country i, sector k and year t, AggProdikt, or its OP
components, the unweighted average rm productivity, AvgProdikt, and the covariance between rm
productivity and employment share, CovProdikt. By the properties of OLS, the coe¢ cient estimates from
the regressions for AvgProdikt and CovProdikt will sum to the coe¢ cient estimates from the regression
for AggProdikt, but we estimate all three regressions in order to determine the sign, magnitude and
signicance of each e¤ect. There are no e¢ ciency gains from using a simultaneous system of equations
because the regressions feature the same right-hand side variables.
Specication (4.1) includes country-year pair xed e¤ects,  it, such that EX and IM are identi-
ed from the variation across sectors within countries at a given point in time. The  it account for
macroeconomic supply and demand shocks at the country-year level that a¤ect trade and productivity
symmetrically in all sectors, such as movements in aggregate income, labor supply, or exchange rates. Im-
plicitly, the xed e¤ects also capture non-transient country characteristics such as geographic remoteness
and global shocks such as the 2008-2009 nancial crisis. We cluster standard errors, "ikt, by sector-year
to accommodate cross-country correlation in sector-specic shocks.
We add several controls Zikt to alleviate concerns with omitted variable bias and sample selection.
First, there may be worldwide sector trends in supply and demand conditions. To capture these, we
condition on the average log number of rms, lnNkt, and the average log employment, lnLkt, by sector-
year across countries. Second, the rm-level data that underlie CompNet are subject to minimum rm size
thresholds. These thresholds vary across countries, and are subsumed by the country-year xed e¤ects.
As extra precaution, we also include the log number of rms by country-sector-year, lnNikt, but the
results are not sensitive to this. Finally, we implement two sample corrections to guard against outliers.
We exclude country-sector-year observations that are based on data for fewer than 20 rms. We also drop
observations with extreme annual growth rates in the top or bottom percentile of the distribution for
any of the key variables (AggProdikt, AvgProdikt, CovProdikt, ExpDemandikt, ImpCompikt, lnNikt).
These two corrections lter out 11% of the raw sample.
4.2 OLS Results
We rst assess the correlation between trade and aggregate economic activity using specication (4.1).
In Columns 1-3 of Table 3, we nd that export expansion is associated with higher log manufacturing
output, log value added and log employment. Conversely, more intense import penetration is correlated
with lower domestic output and employment, but nevertheless higher value added.
Turning to the trade-productivity nexus in Columns 4-6, aggregate exports and imports are both
positively correlated with aggregate productivity. These correlations are economically large and highly
statistically signicant at 1%: A 20% rise in ExpDemandikt and ImpCompikt is associated with 2.5% and
2.1% higher AggProdikt, respectively. While comparable, these magnitudes mask important di¤erences
between export and import activity. Export expansion is accompanied by both stronger average rm
productivity and increased concentration of activity in more productive rms, with the former channel
roughly twice the magnitude of the latter. By contrast, deeper import penetration entails higher rm
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productivity on average, but a shift in activity towards less productive rms.
The bin scatters in Figure 5 provide a non-parametric illustration of the conditional correlation be-
tween aggregate productivity and trade exposure. A point represents average values across country-sector-
year triplets within each of 100 percentile bins, after demeaning by country-year xed e¤ects. The plots
indicate that AggProdikt is strongly positively correlated with both ExpDemandikt and ImpCompikt
across the distribution.
Although not causal, this evidence is consistent with increased foreign demand boosting aggregate
productivity and production activity, and with sti¤er import competition stimulating productivity growth
while depressing overall production. The OLS results also suggest that di¤erent aspects of globalization
may inuence aggregate productivity through di¤erent channels.
Equation (4.1) identies the long-run correlation between productivity and trade activity. We consider
the short to medium term in Appendix Table 2, where we study how changes in productivity co-move
with concurrent changes in imports and exports over 1-, 3- and 5-year overlapping periods.29 By rst-
di¤erencing all left- and right-hand side variables and including year xed e¤ects, we subsume country-
sector xed e¤ects and global growth shocks. The productivity-trade relationship is stronger at medium
horizons of 3 to 5 years, but nevertheless sizeable even in the very short run of 1 year.
5 Impact of Trade on Aggregate Productivity: IV Causation
5.1 The Endogeneity Problem
The baseline OLS correlations may not identify the causal e¤ect of globalization on aggregate productivity
because of two potential sources of endogeneity. One concern is that trade and productivity performance
are jointly determined by some omitted variable. Given the country-year xed e¤ects in the OLS speci-
cation, such omitted variable bias would have to vary systematically across sectors within country-years
to explain our ndings.
Reverse causality poses an arguably more important concern: Aggregate productivity can drive trade
activity. In general equilibrium, export ows reect both endogenous supply conditions in the exporting
country and exogenous demand conditions in the importing country. Trade theory implies that rms in a
more productive country-sector would be more competitive on world markets and therefore realize higher
exports, biasing OLS estimates of EX positively. Analogously, import ows reect both endogenous
demand conditions in the importing country and exogenous supply conditions in the exporting country.
Given local demand, a less productive country-sector would be less competitive from the perspective of
foreign rms and induce more entry by foreign suppliers, biasing OLS estimates of IM negatively. Other
mechanisms may generate reverse causality that biases EX and IM either upwards or downwards.
29The exact estimating equation is Yikt = + EX ExpDemandikt + IM ImpCompikt +  Zikt + 't + "ikt.
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5.2 IV Strategy
In order to identify the causal e¤ects of trade, we adopt a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation
strategy. In the rst stage, we use instrumental variables IVikt to isolate arguably exogenous movements
in export demand and import supply, \ExpDemandikt and \ImpCompikt, from observed exports and
imports, ExpDemandikt and ImpCompikt. In the second stage, we regress aggregate productivity on
these predicted exogenous trade values in place of their endogenous counterparts:
Yikt = + EX \ExpDemandikt + IM \ImpCompikt +  Zikt +  it(+ kt) + "ikt (second stage) (5.1)
fExpDemandikt, ImpCompiktg = IV +  IV Zikt +IV IVikt + it(+kt) + ikt (rst stage) (5.2)
We condition on controls Zikt and country-year xed e¤ects,  it and it, as in the OLS baseline. In
robustness checks, we further add sector xed e¤ects,  k and k, or sector-year xed e¤ects,  kt and kt.
These account respectively for permanent and time-variant di¤erences in supply and demand conditions
across sectors that a¤ect all countries, such as factor intensities, technological growth and consumer
preferences. We continue to cluster standard errors, "ikt and ikt, by sector-year.
The ideal instruments for trade exposure would be relevant by having predictive power in explaining
trade ows, and would meet the exclusion restriction by a¤ecting productivity only through the trade
channel. In the case of ExpDemandikt, we would therefore like to isolate exogenous foreign demand for
ik products in year t from country is endogenous export supply of sector k goods in year t. In the case
of ImpCompikt, we would like to separate exogenous foreign supply of k products to i in year t from is
endogenous import demand for k goods in year t.
We use Bartik instruments, which we construct by combining information on countriesinitial trade
structure at the start of the panel with their trade partnerscontemporaneous trade ows with the rest
of the world.30 This IV strategy capitalizes on two ideas: First, the share of country is exports in sector
k going to destination d at time t = 0, Xidk;t=0Xik;t=0 , and the share of is imports coming from origin o at time
t = 0, Moik;t=0Mik;t=0 , are not inuenced by subsequent exogenous shocks respectively to aggregate demand in
d and to aggregate supply in o. Second, aggregate demand for sector k goods in destination d at time
t can be proxied with ds total absorption of k products, dened as domestic production plus imports
minus exports, Ydkt +M i;dkt  X i;dkt. This corresponds to total expenditure in d on k, or market size
in the model. Aggregate supply of sector k goods from origin o at time t can be measured with os export
value added for nal consumption of k products, XV Afinal i;okt. This accounts for the fact that countries
use imported inputs in production, and aims to isolate supply shocks specic to o. We conservatively
focus on exports for nal consumption to shut down any global input-output linkages and capture pure
import competition induced by o. Note that we exclude bilateral trade between country i and destination
d (origin o) when constructing foreign demand (supply) shocks pertinent to i.
For each country-sector-year triplet ikt, we instrument export demand with foreign demand condi-
tions, FDemandikt, computed as the weighted average absorption across is export destinations using
30These instruments are similar in spirit to those in Hummels et al. (2014) and Berman et al. (2015) among others.
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is initial export shares as weights. We instrument import competition with foreign supply capacity,
FSupplyikt, calculated as the weighted average export value added for nal consumption across is im-
port origins, using is initial import shares as weights. To guard against measurement error or business
cycle uctuations, we take average trade shares over the rst three years in the panel, 1998-2000.
In addition to the Bartik instruments, we also exploit the variation in import tari¤s across countries,
sectors and years, MTariffikt. We take the simple average applied tari¤  ipt across the NPk products
p within sector k at time t, using data from WITS. MTariffikt captures trade policy shocks that a¤ect






















Conceptually, we think of FDemandikt as an instrument for ExpDemandikt, and view FSupplyikt
and MTariffikt as instruments for ImpCompikt. In practice of course, all three instruments enter the
IV rst stage for both endogenous variables.
5.3 Baseline IV Results
Table 4 indicates that the three instruments perform well in the rst stage. The measure of exogenous
foreign demand has a positive e¤ect on observed exports, the measure of exogenous foreign supply has a
positive e¤ect on observed import penetration, and import tari¤s strongly deter imports. These patterns
are highly statistically and economically signicant and robust to adding sector or sector-year xed e¤ects
to the baseline country-year xed e¤ects. The most conservative estimates in Columns 3 and 6 imply
that a one-standard-deviation improvement in FDemandikt leads to 34% higher ExpDemandikt, while
a one-standard-deviation rise in FSupplyikt increases ImpCompikt by 49%. Reducing import barriers by
10% translates into 13% higher imports. The R-squared in these regressions reaches 89%-99%.
Table 5 presents the second-stage estimates for the causal e¤ects of globalization. Two ndings stand
out. First, export demand and import competition both signicantly increase aggregate productivity,
AggProdikt. In the baseline with only country-year xed e¤ects in Column 1, 20% growth in export
demand boosts overall productivity by 8%, while 20% rise in import competition leads to 1.4% higher
productivity. In the most restrictive specication that adds sector-year xed e¤ects in Column 7, these
productivity gains amount to 7.3% and 10%, respectively.
Second, Table 5 reveals that the productivity impacts of export and import expansion are mediated
through di¤erent channels. Export growth both sizeably improves average rm productivity, AvgProdikt,
and reallocates activity towards more productive rms, as manifested in higher CovProdikt. The latter
contributes 26% of the total productivity benet in the baseline (Column 3), and up to 38% in the most
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stringent specication (Column 9). By contrast, all productivity gains from import competition result
from higher average rm productivity and are partly o¤set by a shift in resources towards less productive
rms. The latter negates 24% of average productivity growth in the baseline (Column 3) and 14% with
sector-year xed e¤ects (Column 9).
The asymmetric e¤ects of export demand and import competition on allocative e¢ ciency signal that
the "right" rms may be able to access relatively more resources than the "wrong" rms during boom
times, compared to bust times. This suggests that the root causes of misallocation matter. In the case
of nancial market frictions, for example, imperfect information may play out in di¤erent ways during
peaks and troughs. Financiers may have incomplete knowledge of rm fundamentals, and make nancing
decisions based on expected future prots (which depend on fundamentals) and on past performance and
collateralizable assets (which depend on previous distortions in capital allocation). Since expansions in
export demand and import competition have opposite e¤ects on rm prots, the results are consistent
with lenders being more willing to extend capital based on the net present value of future prots during
boom times, and conversely tying funding more closely to collateral during bust times.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We perform extensive sensitivity analysis in Appendix Table 3 to validate the robustness of the baseline
results. We record consistently large and signicant e¤ects of international trade on all three productivity
outcomes, safe for imprecisely estimated e¤ects of ImpCompikt on CovProdikt in specications with
country-year and sector-year xed e¤ects.
Alternative specication We rst consider each dimension of trade exposure one at a time, to
ensure that the estimated e¤ects of export and import activity are not driven by multi-colinearity. When
we focus on export access, we include only ExpDemandikt in the second stage and use FDemandikt
as the single instrument in the rst stage. When we examine import penetration, we introduce only
ImpCompikt in the second stage and exploit only FSupplyikt and MTariffikt as instruments in the
rst stage. Panels A and B show that this delivers qualitatively similar results and quantitatively bigger
magnitudes for each dimension of globalization.
Panel C conrms that the baseline results barely change when we lag ExpDemandikt and ImpCompikt
by one year. This speaks to possible delayed e¤ects of international trade on aggregate productivity that
can arise through gradual adjustment within and across rms.
Alternative measures The ndings are also robust to using a relative instead of an absolute
indicator of import competition. The baseline measure ImpCompikt reects the scale of foreign suppliers
activity in the home market, where the country-year xed e¤ects implicitly control for home market
size. Through the lens of the model, an equally valid measure of import competition is the ratio of
imports to domestic production. We therefore construct ImpCompRatioikt =
P
j;s6=kXjikst=Outputik,
averaging the denominator across years within country-industry pairs to mitigate concerns with domestic
production endogenously responding to import penetration. Panel D corroborates the main results when
we estimate specication (5.1) using ImpCompRatioikt in place of ImpCompikt and an analogously
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constructed instrument FSupplyRatioikt in place of FSupplyikt.31
Alternative outlier treatment We conduct additional tests to ensure that outliers are
not driving the results. The baseline sample already excludes country-sector-year observations that
aggregate fewer than 20 rms or exhibit annual growth in the top or bottom percentile for key variables
(i.e. AggProdikt, AvgProdikt, CovProdikt, ExpDemandikt, ImpCompikt, FDemandikt, FSupplyikt).
In Panel E, we show that the main ndings survive when we further winsorize these variables at the
1st and 99th percentiles. Of note, winsorizing produces a signicant negative e¤ect of ImpCompikt on
CovProdikt even when the regression includes both country-year and sector-year xed e¤ects.
5.5 Additional Results
We next present a series of additional results that both inform economic questions of interest and help
alleviate outstanding econometric concerns.
5.5.1 Sector composition
Recall from Section 2.6 that with multiple di¤erentiated sectors, the e¤ect of globalization on economy-
wide aggregate productivity is a weighted average of the e¤ects on sector-level productivity. The baseline
specication treats sectors symmetrically, such that EX and IM quantify the impact of trade on the
average sector. Our ndings remain unchanged or stronger when we instead weight observations by
the initial country-specic employment share of each industry in Panel A of Table 6. This is a model-
consistent measure of an industrys contribution to economy-wide productivity.
In Europe as in other advanced countries, the services sector has grown to capture a majority of
aggregate employment and production. Since aggregate productivity and trade data are available only
for manufacturing industries, the baseline analysis evaluates the impact of globalization in manufacturing.
We can nevertheless account for the variation in the size of the services sector across country-years by
weighting observations by the share of manufacturing in total employment by country-year. The weighted
regressions in Panel B of Table 6 reveal quantitatively and qualitatively similar patterns as the baseline.
These estimates would reect the impact of globalization on the average sector across both manufacturing
and services, under the assumption that productivity in the average manufacturing sector exhibits the
same trade elasticity as the average services sector, even if these elasticities vary across individual sectors.
5.5.2 Chinese import competition
A major shock to the global economy in the 21st century has been the dramatic rise of China. Chinas
exports grew rapidly after it joined the WTO in 2001 and MFA binding quotas on its textiles and apparel
were lifted in 2005. This shock has contributed signicantly to the deepening of import competition in
many developed economies not only because of its scale, but also because it has increased competition
specically from producers in a large country with lower (although growing) wages and productivity.
31The results are also robust to proxying import competition with the ratio of imports to domestic absorption or domestic
employment. These two measures are not theoretically founded, but the former reects the domestic market size, while the
latter is independent of local factor and product prices.
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We compare the impact of import competition from China, ChinaImpCompikt, and import compe-
tition from the rest of the world, ROWImpCompikt, on aggregate productivity in Europe. We measure
ChinaImpCompikt with country is imports of sector k goods from China in year t, net of sector k imports
used by i in the production of k products. We calculate ROWImpCompikt as in the baseline, excluding
China from the calculation. We correspondingly construct two new instruments for ChinaImpCompikt
and ROWImpCompikt, ChinaSupplyikt and ROWSupplyikt, which replace FSupplyikt in the IV rst
stage. For example, ChinaSupplyikt captures Chinas global export supply in sector k and year t with
Chinese total export value added for nal consumption, XV AfinalChina;kt, and recognizes that the impact of
this supply shock will vary across importing countries i based on Chinas initial share in is imports of k










We present the results in Panel C of Table 6. The ndings for the productivity impact of export
demand remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar. Conditioning on both country-year and sector-
year xed e¤ects, Chinese and ROW import competition induce similar adjustments: They both stimulate
aggregate productivity by raising average rm productivity while lowering the productivity covariance
term. At the same time, the gains triggered by Chinese competition are about a third of the gains
caused by competition from other countries of origin. Omitting the sector-year xed e¤ects leaves the
results for ROWImpCompikt unchanged, but ChinaImpCompikt now exerts signicant e¤ects only on
the covariance term.
5.5.3 Skill and mark-up dispersion
While we have emphasized the role of heterogeneity in rm productivity, in practice rms may also di¤er
in the skill of their labor force. This may arise because rms make endogenous hiring decisions, or because
exogenous variation in worker skill or rm-worker match quality is unobserved at the hiring stage. This
raises the possibility that measured real value added per worker may confound rm productivity with
employee skill, but the two causes for skill dispersion across rms would have di¤erent implications for
the interpretation of the results: In the latter case it would pose the threat of omitted variable bias, while
in the former case it would be merely a manifestation of the underlying productivity heterogeneity.
To be conservative, in Panel D of Table 6 we explicitly control for skill dispersion across rms.
In particular, we condition on the 90th-10th interpercentile ratio of average wage across rms within
country-sector-years, available from CompNet. The baseline results remain unchanged.
A separate concern is the potential mark-up heterogeneity across rms. The model in Section 2 shuts
down variable mark-ups in the di¤erentiated sector by assuming CES consumption and monopolistic
competition, in order to focus on misallocation due to distortions to input costs. In practice, such mark-
up heterogeneity can introduce measurement error in real value-added per worker at the rm level, which
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can, in turn, lead to measurement error in aggregate productivity, average productivity and productivity-
size covariance at the sector level.
Panel E of Table 6 provides suggestive evidence that mark-up heterogeneity does not contribute to the
estimated e¤ects of globalization on aggregate productivity. These regressions control for the 90th-10th
interpercentile ratio of the price-to-cost margin across rms within country-sector-years; this is the best
available proxy for mark-up dispersion and comes from CompNet.
6 How Trade A¤ects Productivity: Mechanisms
Our estimation approach identies the independent e¤ects of export demand and import competition,
which we interpret as the e¤ects of unilateral export and import liberalization through the lens of theory.
We now argue that the empirical results are consistent with globalization shaping aggregate productivity
by triggering reallocations across heterogeneous rms in the presence of resource misallocation.
We base this conclusion on three pieces of evidence. First, the empirical ndings can be rationalized
only with numerical simulations for the case of misallocation. Second, the e¤ect of trade on rm selection
is not a su¢ cient statistic for its e¤ect on aggregate productivity, counter to model predictions without
distortions. Finally, the impact of trade on aggregate productivity depends on countries measured
institutional and market e¢ ciency. Although the consequences of misallocation for the gains from trade
are in principle ambiguous, nding that institutional frictions do moderate these gains implies that
misallocation plays a role. While the rst two arguments for misallocation rely on model-dependent
inference, the last one constitutes direct, model-independent evidence.
6.1 Pattern of Trade E¤ects
The sign pattern for the estimated e¤ects of ExpDemandikt on fAggProdikt; AvgProdikt; CovProdiktg is
f+;+;+g, while that for ImpCompikt is f+;+; g. This suggests that export access generates aggregate
productivity gains through the exit of relatively less productive rms and the reallocation of market share
towards more productive rms. By contrast, import competition induces cleansing along the extensive
margin and worsens allocative e¢ ciency along the intensive margin, for a net positive e¤ect on aggregate
productivity. Our extensive numerical exercises indicate that the model in Section 2 can only generate
this pattern when there is resource misallocation across rms (see Table 1 and Figure 2).
Consider rst the case of no resource misallocation. Increased export demand lowers the productivity
cut-o¤ for exporting, such that the productivity cut-o¤ for domestic production rises due to free entry, and
aggregate productivity, AggProdikt, increases. By contrast, higher import competition has theoretically
ambiguous e¤ects because it intensies competition both at home and abroad, with opposite e¤ects on
the domestic productivity cut-o¤. When home wages can adjust down, this cut-o¤ rises and AggProdikt
goes up, while the converse occurs when wages are xed. Importantly, the numerical exercises indicate
that AggProdikt, AvgProdikt and CovProdikt always move in the same direction.
Consider next the case of resource misallocation. Now both export and import liberalization can have
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ambiguous e¤ects on aggregate productivity, because the economy transitions from one distorted steady
state to another. Numerical exercises show that export liberalization increases all three productivity
terms, fAggProdikt; AvgProdikt; CovProdiktg, over a wide range of the parameter space, regardless of
whether wages are xed or exible. On the other hand, import liberalization can move these outcomes
in di¤erent directions in di¤erent segments of the parameter space. In particular, with xed wages, it is
possible that AggProdikt and AvgProdikt both rise while CovProdikt declines.
Based on our benchmark IV estimates, the direction and magnitude of the productivity e¤ects of a
20% increase in ExpDemandikt and ImpCompikt are thus in line with the numerical simulation for the
case of misallocation under xed wages, intermediate distortion dispersion, and positive productivity-
dispersion correlation (see Panel D and the last line of Panel C in Table 1).
6.2 Firm Selection
We next evaluate the impact of trade exposure on rm selection at the bottom end of the productivity
distribution. In the absence of misallocation, globalization can a¤ect aggregate productivity AggProdikt
by (i) raising the rst-best productivity cut-o¤ 'ii and by (ii) reallocating resources across inframarginal
rms. Moreover, the change in 'ii is a su¢ cient statistic for the change in AvgProdikt and AggProdikt,
but generally not for the change in CovProdikt without additional functional form assumptions. The
empirical counterpart to 'ii is the minimum productivity across rms in a given country-sector-year,
minProdikt. Therefore, controlling for minProdikt in regression (5.1), any residual impact of interna-
tional trade on fAggProdikt; AvgProdiktg would be inconsistent with e¢ cient allocation.
In the presence of misallocation, globalization still a¤ects aggregate productivity via (i) and (ii), but
also by (iii) changing the degree of misallocation by shifting resources across rms along the extensive
and intensive margins. The observed minimum productivity would now be the empirical counterpart
to the distorted productivity threshold '
ii
, which is no longer a su¢ cient statistic for AvgProdikt or
AggProdikt. Controlling for minProdikt, any residual impact of trade on fAggProdikt; AvgProdiktg
would now be consistent with mechanism (iii) and the presence of misallocation.
We nd in Panel A of Table 7 that export demand and import competition both raise minProdikt
(Columns 1 and 5). We measure minProdikt with the rst percentile of log value added per worker
across rms, in order to guard against outliers due to measurement error or idiosyncratic rm shocks.
The estimates imply that the productivity threshold rises by 4%-6.3% and 1.5%-5% following a 20%
expansion in foreign market access and import penetration, respectively.
We then expand IV specication (5.1) to includeminProdikt in the second stage.32 HigherminProdikt
is associated with higher aggregate and average productivity, but lower productivity-size covariance. How-
ever, controlling for minProdikt leaves large residual e¤ects of export demand and import competition
on AggProdikt, as much as 69% and 38% of the baseline estimates (Column 2). These numbers stand at
52% and 46% when we further condition on sector-year xed (Column 6). The point estimates for EX
32We have obtained similar results when controlling for a cubic polynomial in minProdikt. This more exible approach
allows for the mapping of minProdikt to AggProdikt, AvgProdikt and CovProdikt to be unique but non-linear.
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and IM are also reduced by only 48% and 57% in the regression for AvgProdikt (Column 3). In the
specication for CovProdikt, EX increases by 20%, while IM falls by 38% (Column 4).
Through the lens of the model, these results suggest that the observed productivity e¤ects of global-
ization cannot be fully attributed to the reallocation of activity across rms in a frictionless economy via
channels (i) and (ii). Instead, the patterns are consistent with the presence of distortions, whereby inter-
national trade inuences aggregate productivity in part by changing the e¢ ciency with which resources
are allocated across rms.33
6.3 Imperfect Institutions and Market Frictions
In order to provide model-free evidence for the role of misallocation, we nally exploit the cross-country
variation in the strength of institutions that govern the e¢ ciency of factor and product markets. This
approach rests on two premises. First, institutional imperfections constitute structural problems that
generate an ine¢ cient allocation of production inputs and market shares across rms. Institutional
indicators thus identify primitives that microfound resource misallocation in theoretical frameworks. Of
note, the model in Section 2 considers distortions to input costs that map to measures of labor and capital
market frictions, but its predictions would be qualitatively similar with revenue or prot distortions via
sales or corporate taxes that map to measures of product market regulation.
Our second premise is that countries at di¤erent levels of institutional e¢ ciency will respond di¤erently
to trade shocks if and only if misallocation is present and inuences the trade-productivity nexus. Recall
from Section 2 that trade expansion has theoretically ambiguous e¤ects on aggregate productivity under
misallocation, and these e¤ects need not vary smoothly with the degree of misallocation. Showing that
institutional frictions moderate the impact of trade is thus su¢ cient to establish a role for misallocation,
while estimating the direction and magnitude of this moderating force is of independent policy relevance.
We therefore expand IV specication (5.1) to include interactions of export demand and import
competition with country measures of institutional quality, Institutionit, whose level e¤ect is subsumed
by the country-year xed e¤ects. We instrument the main and interaction trade terms using the same
instruments as before and their interactions with Institutionit.
We exploit ve indicators, dened such that higher values signify more e¢ cient and e¤ective in-
stitutions. The rst two are rule of law and corruption, from the World Bank Governance Indicators
(Kaufmann et al. 2010). These are comprehensive indices respectively of general institutional capacity
and scope for rent extraction for private gains, which arguably a¤ect economic e¢ ciency in both input
and output markets. Rule of law has a mean of 1.11 and a standard deviation of 0.49 in the panel; the
33Our analysis abstracts away from the potential impact of globalization on productivity upgrading within rms. This
e¤ect and its consequences for AggProdikt, AvgProdikt and CovProdikt are in principle ambiguous. For example, higher
export demand may increase expected prots and induce rms to upgrade productivity if there are economies of scale in
innovation and adoption (e.g. Bustos 2011). Steeper import competition may discourage innovation by reducing domestic
prots, but it may conversely incentivize incumbents to upgrade productivity in order to remain competitive (e.g. Bloom
et al. 2015, Dhingra 2013). In Panel B of Table 7, we proxy the aggregate amount of productivity upgrading with log R&D
expenditures by country-sector-year, RDikt. We nd mixed e¤ects of export demand and import competition on RDikt.
Moreover, controlling for both minProdikt and RDikt in equation (5.1) leaves large residual productivity e¤ects of trade.
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corresponding statistics for (inverse) corruption are 1.07 and 0.69.
The other three measures characterize institutional e¢ ciency in specic markets. We quantify labor
market exibility with a 0-6 index that averages 21 indicators for ring and hiring costs, from the OECD
Employment Database (mean 3.28, standard deviation 0.37). We proxy nancial market development
with a 0-12 index that captures the strength of creditor rightsprotection necessary to support nancial
contracts, from theWorld Bank Doing Business Report (mean 5.86, standard deviation 1.79). Finally, we
assess the (inverse) tightness of product market regulation with a 0-3 index that aggregates 18 measures
for state control, barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to trade and investment, from the OECD
Market Regulation Database (mean 1.17, standard deviation 0.25).
Table 8 reveals consistent patterns across all ve institutional measures: Strong rule of law, low
corruption, e¢ cient factor and product markets amplify the productivity gains from import competition
and dampen the productivity gains from export expansion. This is true for aggregate productivity,
average rm productivity and allocative e¢ ciency. The interaction terms are highly statistically and
economically signicant for all but 2 out of 30 coe¢ cient estimates.34
These results indicate the complex interactions between international trade and market frictions in
shaping aggregate productivity. They also point to an asymmetry between positive and negative shocks
to domestic rms. The evidence suggests that growth opportunities, such as greater export demand, can
partly correct accumulated misallocation and boost productivity more when markets and institutions are
less e¢ cient. This may occur if the "right" productive rms that start out with sub-optimal resources can
more e¤ectively scale up production than the "wrong" less productive rms. By contrast, contractionary
shocks, such as sti¤er import competition, can engender more cleansing reallocation under more e¢ cient
markets and institutions, such that less productive rms downsize disproportionately more.35 There may
also be less scope for distortionary policy interventions such as heterogeneous subsidies across rms in
response to import-induced contraction than in response to export-induced expansion.
6.4 Misallocation Measures in the Literature
We conclude by examining the impact of international trade on several measures of resource misallocation
that have been proposed in the literature. While micro-founded, these measures are valid under modeling
assumptions that are likely to fail in realistic economic environments. Under certain assumptions, Hsieh-
Klenow (2009) and Gopinath et al. (2015) show that the observed dispersion across rms in revenue-based
total factor productivity (TFPR), marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK), and marginal revenue
product of labor (MRPL) monotonically increases with misallocation in input and output markets. Under
certain assumptions, Edmond et al. (2015) likewise nd that the observed dispersion across rms in price-
cost mark-ups (PCM) signals output-market distortions.
34These ndings are generally robust to adding sector-year xed e¤ects (Panel A of Appendix Table 4). The key aspect
of labor market exibility is the governance of regular individual contracts (Panel B of Appendix Table 4). The governance
of collective regular contracts and temporary contracts play a much lesser role.
35Table 8 speaks to the di¤erential e¤ects of export and import shocks across economies at di¤erent levels of institutional
and market e¢ ciency. This is conceptually distinct from and thus not inconsistent with the baseline asymmetric e¤ects of
export and import shocks on allocative e¢ ciency CovProdikt in Table 5, which capture average e¤ects across countries.
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There are several di¢ culties in interpreting these indicators in terms of allocative e¢ ciency. First,
measurement error in rm TFPR, MRPK, MRPL and PCM can inate their observed dispersion. Second,
TFPR, MRPK and MRPL are inferred from production function estimates, such that treating them as
regression outcomes can complicate econometric inference. Third, the nature of production technology
and market competition can a¤ect these dispersion metrics even in the absence of resource misallocation.
Foster et al. (2008) show that TFPR, MRPK and MRPL dispersion implies misallocation of production
inputs under constant mark-ups, but not under variable mark-ups. Dhingra-Morrow (2014) further
demonstrate that market-share misallocation arises in product markets with variable mark-ups even
when there are no distortions in factor markets. Bartelsman et al. (2013) and Foster et al. (2015, 2016)
establish that TFPR, MRPK and MRPL dispersion signals resource misallocation under constant returns
to scale and no shocks to rm demand or productivity. However, this is no longer the case if rms face
increasing returns to scale or adjustment costs.
Given prior empirical evidence of variable mark-ups, increasing returns to scale, and adjustment costs,
it can thus be di¢ cult to interpret the four dispersion measures. We nevertheless explore the e¤ect of
international trade on these dispersion outcomes in our data in Appendix Table 5. For each country, sector
and year, CompNet reports the standard deviations of TFPR, MRPK and MRPL, as well as the 90th-10th
interpercentile range for PCM. We generally nd positive signicant e¤ects of import competition across
the four Dispersionikt metrics, but mixed results for export demand (see also DeLoecker and Warczinsky
2012 on PCM). Were Dispersionikt and CovProdikt indicative of misallocation, our conclusion that
export access (import penetration) enhances (reduces) allocative e¢ ciency would have been consistent
with Dispersionikt falling (rising) with ExpDemandikt (ImpCompikt).
7 Conclusion
We examine the impact of international trade on aggregate productivity. Theoretically, we show that
bilateral and unilateral export liberalizations increase aggregate productivity, while unilateral import
liberalization can either raise or reduce it. However, all three trade reforms have ambiguous e¤ects in
the presence of resource misallocation. Using unique new data on 14 European countries and 20 manu-
facturing industries during 1998-2011, we empirically establish that exogenous shocks to export demand
and import competition generate large aggregate productivity gains. Although both trade activities in-
crease average rm productivity, however, export expansion reallocates activity towards more productive
rms, while import penetration acts in reverse. Unpacking the mechanisms of transmission, we show
that improved rm selection can account for only half of the productivity gains from trade, suggesting
a potential role for resource misallocation. Indeed, e¢ cient institutions, factor and product markets
amplify the productivity gains from import competition, but dampen those from export expansion.
Our ndings have important implications for policy design in developing countries that aspire to
promote growth through greater economic integration but su¤er from weak institutions and signicant
frictions in capital, labor and product markets. The analysis suggests that reallocation across rms is
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a key margin of adjustment, while alleviating market distortions can be important for realizing the full
welfare gains from globalization. Our results also indicate that developed economies stand to gain from
import and export liberalization, despite concerns about the impact of import competition from low-wage
countries.
There remains much scope for further research. Richer data would make it possible to examine
how international trade a¤ects the incentives for technological upgrading across the rm productivity
distribution. It would also be valuable to assess the impact of specic frictions in capital, labor and
product markets on rm selection, rm innovation, and reallocations across rms. These constitute some
steps towards understanding how to design trade policy and coordinate it with structural reforms that
remove institutional and market imperfections in order to improve welfare.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. No Misallocation (Pareto)
Flexible w 4.76% 4.76% 3.52% 1.23% 1.67% 1.67% 1.23% 0.43% 2.52% 2.52% 1.87% 0.65%
Fixed w 3.31% 4.76% 3.52% 1.23% 4.96% 7.16% 5.32% 1.83% -0.85% -1.21% -0.91% -0.31%
Panel B. No Misallocation (Log-Normal)
Flexible w 3.92% 3.50% 2.75% 0.75% 1.39% 1.22% 0.96% 0.26% 1.95% 1.72% 1.35% 0.37%
Fixed w 2.73% 3.50% 2.75% 0.75% 3.77% 4.88% 3.83% 1.05% -0.49% -0.60% -0.48% -0.12%
Panel C. Misallocation (Joint Log-Normal)
Flexible w
3.92% 3.49% 2.65% 0.84% 1.40% 1.22% 0.92% 0.30% 1.96% 1.72% 1.30% 0.42%
3.87% 3.47% 2.80% 0.67% 1.37% 1.21% 0.98% 0.22% 1.93% 1.70% 1.38% 0.32%
3.85% 3.47% 2.94% 0.53% 1.35% 1.20% 1.04% 0.16% 1.91% 1.70% 1.46% 0.24%
Fixed w
-1.68% -0.05% -0.16% 0.11% 2.32% 2.26% 1.77% 0.49% -3.27% -1.55% -1.37% -0.18%
2.70% 3.48% 2.81% 0.67% 2.62% 4.46% 3.54% 0.91% 0.58% -0.21% -0.13% -0.08%
0.92% 7.71% 6.42% 1.29% 0.15% 8.47% 7.11% 1.36% 1.38% 0.03% 0.11% -0.09%
Panel D. Data
Estimated Effects (ctry-year FE) 7.96% 5.90% 2.06% 1.36% 1.80% -0.42%
Estimated Effects (ctry-year & sector-year FE) 7.34% 4.52% 2.82% 10.04% 11.70% -1.66%
Table 1. Numerical Simulation: Gains from Trade
This table reports numerical and estimation results for the impact of reducing bilateral trade costs, unilateral export costs or
unilateral import costs by 20%. Panels A-C show the change in welfare, aggregate productivity, average firm productivity and
the covariance of firms' productivity and employment share in different economic environments. In Panels A and B, there is no
resource misallocation, and productivity is Pareto or Log-Normal distributed. In Panel C, there is misallocation, and productivity
and distortions are joint Log-Normal with ση=0.15 and ρ(ϕ,η)={-0.4,0,0.4}. All other parameter values are as discussed in the
text. Panel D reports the estimated effect of increasing export demand or import competition by 20% based on the baseline IV
results in Table 5. 







N Mean St Dev
Panel A. Country-Sector-Year Level
ln Output 2,811 8.09 1.77
ln Value Added 2,811 13.51 2.03
ln Employment 2,811 10.21 1.35
ln Exports 2,811 7.65 1.74
ln (Imports - Own-Sector Imp Inputs) 2,811 6.41 1.97
ln Aggregate Productivity 2,811 3.21 1.13
ln Average Productivity 2,811 2.98 1.19
Covariance Term 2,811 0.23 0.22
Δ ln Aggregate Productivity, Δ = 1 year 2,548 0.04 0.10
Δ ln Average Productivity, Δ = 1 year 2,548 0.03 0.09
Δ Covariance Term, Δ = 1 year 2,548 0.01 0.08
Δ ln Aggregate Productivity, Δ = 3 years 2,073 0.11 0.19
Δ ln Average Productivity, Δ = 3 years 2,073 0.09 0.17
Δ Covariance Term, Δ = 3 years 2,073 0.02 0.12
Δ ln Aggregate Productivity, Δ = 5 years 1,587 0.18 0.25
Δ ln Average Productivity, Δ = 5 years 1,587 0.16 0.22
Δ Covariance Term, Δ = 5 years 1,587 0.02 0.14
Panel B. Country(-Year) Level
Rule of Law 144 1.11 0.49
(Inverse) Corruption 144 1.07 0.69
Labor Market Flexibility 130 3.28 0.37
Creditor Rights Protection 14 5.86 1.79
(Inverse) Product Market Regulation 13 1.17 0.25
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
This table summarizes the variation in aggregate economic activity, aggregate
productivity, international trade activity, and institutional and market frictions across
countries, sectors and years in the 1998-2011 panel. All variables are defined in the
text. The unit of observation is indicated in the panel heading.











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp Dem (ikt) 0.403*** 0.380*** 0.243*** 0.125*** 0.080*** 0.045***
(0.029) (0.022) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.007)
Imp Comp (ikt) -0.139*** 0.041*** -0.066*** 0.106*** 0.124*** -0.019***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.005)
ln N Firms (ikt) 0.552*** 0.573*** 0.736*** -0.161*** -0.122*** -0.039***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.007)
Avg ln N Firms (kt) -0.969*** -0.710*** -0.727*** 0.023 0.100*** -0.077***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.023) (0.033) (0.033) (0.010)
Avg ln Employment (kt) 1.285*** 0.653*** 0.858*** -0.182*** -0.245*** 0.063***
(0.065) (0.045) (0.028) (0.040) (0.041) (0.020)
N 2,811 2,811 2,811 2,811 2,811 2,811
R2 0.927 0.928 0.949 0.849 0.868 0.519
Country*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
This table examines the relationship between aggregate economic activity, aggregate productivity and trade
exposure at the country-sector-year level. The outcome variable is indicated in the column heading and
described in the text. All columns include country-year pair fixed effects, and control for the log number of
firms by country-sector-year, the average log number of firms across countries by sector-year, and the
average log employment across countries by sector-year. Standard errors clustered by sector-year in
parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Table 3. Trade and Aggregate Performance: OLS Correlation
Economic Activity Aggregate Productivity
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign Demand (ikt) 0.638*** 0.458*** 0.443*** -0.002 -0.007 -0.036
(0.034) (0.056) (0.062) (0.022) (0.027) (0.030)
Foreign Supply (ikt) 0.087*** 0.139** 0.140* 0.868*** 0.422*** 0.345***
(0.015) (0.066) (0.081) (0.007) (0.027) (0.031)
Import Tariff (ikt) -4.693*** 0.307 0.662 -2.802*** -0.986** -1.332***
(0.847) (0.669) (0.816) (0.507) (0.407) (0.437)
ln N Firms (ikt) 0.555*** 0.564*** 0.569*** 0.036** 0.008 0.007
(0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Avg ln N Firms (kt) -0.741*** -0.539*** -0.112*** 0.110*
(0.033) (0.134) (0.025) (0.062)
Avg ln Employment (kt) 0.344*** 0.490*** 0.113*** -0.042
(0.065) (0.089) (0.042) (0.055)
N 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777
R2 0.889 0.921 0.924 0.974 0.985 0.986
Country*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector FE N Y N N Y N
Sector*Year FE N N Y N N Y
Exp Dem (ikt) Imp Comp (ikt)
Table 4. Instrumenting Export Demand and Import Competition: IV First Stage
This table presents the baseline IV first stage. It examines the impact of foreign supply, foreign demand and
import tariffs on export and import activity at the country-sector-year level. The outcome variable is indicated
in the column heading and described in the text. All columns include country-year pair fixed effects and the
full set of controls in Table 3. Columns 2 and 5 (3 and 6) also include sector (sector-year pair) fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by sector-year in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
^Exp Dem (ikt) 0.398*** 0.295*** 0.103*** 0.300*** 0.197** 0.103** 0.367*** 0.226** 0.141***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.014) (0.097) (0.085) (0.045) (0.109) (0.098) (0.050)
^Imp Comp (ikt) 0.068*** 0.090*** -0.021*** 0.294** 0.296** -0.002 0.502*** 0.585*** -0.083
(0.014) (0.014) (0.005) (0.131) (0.118) (0.042) (0.185) (0.166) (0.059)
ln N Firms (ikt) -0.321*** -0.248*** -0.073*** -0.257*** -0.185*** -0.072** -0.292*** -0.196*** -0.097***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.012) (0.062) (0.054) (0.029) (0.067) (0.061) (0.032)
Avg ln N Firms (kt) 0.327*** 0.334*** -0.007 0.061 0.030 0.031
(0.046) (0.046) (0.019) (0.127) (0.123) (0.052)
Avg ln Employment (kt) -0.461*** -0.458*** -0.003 0.054 0.021 0.033
(0.054) (0.055) (0.027) (0.128) (0.125) (0.052)
N 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777
R2 0.820 0.852 0.485 0.869 0.897 0.635 0.856 0.887 0.649
Ctry*Year FE, Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector FE N N N Y Y Y N N N
Sector*Year FE N N N N N N Y Y Y
This table presents the baseline IV second stage. It examines the impact of instrumented export demand and import competition on
aggregate productivity at the country-sector-year level. The outcome variable is indicated in the column heading and described in
the text. All columns include country-year pair fixed effects and the full set of controls in Table 3. Columns 4-6 (7-9) also include
sector (sector-year pair) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by sector-year in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Table 5. Impact of Trade on Aggregate Productivity: IV Second Stage











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Country-Sector Weights: Initial Share of Manuf Employment, L (ikt=0) / LM (it=0)
^Exp Dem (ikt) 0.427*** 0.360*** 0.067*** 0.467*** 0.359*** 0.108***
(0.039) (0.036) (0.011) (0.102) (0.090) (0.039)
^Imp Comp (ikt) 0.075*** 0.092*** -0.017*** 0.498*** 0.494*** 0.004
(0.015) (0.014) (0.005) (0.151) (0.141) (0.043)
Panel B. Country-Year Weights: Manufacturing Share of Total Employment, LM (it) / L (it)
^Exp Dem (ikt) 0.385*** 0.288*** 0.097*** 0.436*** 0.267*** 0.168***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.013) (0.112) (0.101) (0.052)
^Imp Comp (ikt) 0.069*** 0.091*** -0.022*** 0.703*** 0.811*** -0.108*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.005) (0.193) (0.175) (0.063)
Panel C. Import Competition from China vs. ROW
^Exp Dem (ikt) 0.371*** 0.290*** 0.082*** 0.337*** 0.200** 0.137***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.013) (0.104) (0.093) (0.047)
^Imp Comp ROW (ikt) 0.082*** 0.086*** -0.004 0.398** 0.484*** -0.086
(0.015) (0.015) (0.006) (0.182) (0.163) (0.067)
^Imp Comp China (ikt) -0.015 0.005 -0.019*** 0.136** 0.141*** -0.005
(0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.058) (0.051) (0.023)
Panel D. Skill Dispersion across Firms
^Exp Dem (ikt) 0.394*** 0.291*** 0.103*** 0.364*** 0.224** 0.140***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.014) (0.109) (0.099) (0.050)
^Imp Comp (ikt) 0.066*** 0.088*** -0.022*** 0.501*** 0.584*** -0.083
(0.014) (0.014) (0.005) (0.184) (0.165) (0.059)
90-10 Wage Ratio (ikt) -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 -0.001** -0.001* -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel E. Mark-Up Dispersion across Firms
^Exp Dem (ikt) 0.397*** 0.294*** 0.103*** 0.367*** 0.226** 0.141***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.014) (0.109) (0.098) (0.050)
^Imp Comp (ikt) 0.068*** 0.090*** -0.022*** 0.509*** 0.591*** -0.082
(0.014) (0.014) (0.005) (0.184) (0.165) (0.059)
90-10 PCM Ratio (ikt) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ctry*Year FE, Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector*Year FE N N N Y Y Y
Table 6. Additional Results
This table provides additional evidence on the impact of export demand and import competition
on aggregate productivity at the country-sector-year level, based on Columns 1-3 and 7-9 in
Table 5. Panel A weights observations at the country-sector level by the initial share of a sector in
manufacturing employment. Panel B weights observations at the country-year level by the share
of manufacturing in total employment. Panel C distinguishes between import competition from
China vs. Rest Of the World. Panels D-E control for skill and mark-up dispersion across firms with
the 90th-10th inter-percentile ratio in firm-level wages and price-to-cost margins. Standard errors
clustered by sector-year in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Panel A. Firm Selection















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
^Exp Dem (ikt) 0.198*** 0.275*** 0.152*** 0.124*** 0.314*** 0.190*** 0.023 0.166***
(0.040) (0.027) (0.020) (0.013) (0.108) (0.072) (0.053) (0.049)
^Imp Comp (ikt) 0.073*** 0.026*** 0.039*** -0.013** 0.249 0.230* 0.324*** -0.095
(0.015) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.173) (0.123) (0.099) (0.059)
ln min Prod (ikt) 0.642*** 0.733*** -0.091*** 0.653*** 0.676*** -0.023**
(0.025) (0.018) (0.011) (0.024) (0.021) (0.009)
N 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,750
R2 0.911 0.913 0.948 0.473 0.930 0.938 0.959 0.619
Ctry*Year FE, Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector*Year FE N N N N Y Y Y Y
Panel B. Firm Selection & Innovation















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
^Exp Dem (ikt) 0.103 0.282*** 0.154*** 0.129*** 0.370 0.237*** 0.055 0.182***
(0.115) (0.027) (0.019) (0.012) (0.448) (0.083) (0.057) (0.052)
^Imp Comp (ikt) 0.164*** 0.016* 0.038*** -0.022*** -3.680*** 0.190 0.241** -0.051
(0.046) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.527) (0.135) (0.105) (0.068)
ln min Prod (ikt) 0.657*** 0.736*** -0.079*** 0.654*** 0.676*** -0.022**
(0.022) (0.016) (0.009) (0.024) (0.020) (0.009)
ln R&D (ikt) -0.000 -0.018*** 0.017*** -0.018 -0.031*** 0.012**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006)
N 2,777 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,777 2,750 2,750 2,750
R2 0.999 0.915 0.949 0.501 0.999 0.936 0.961 0.599
Ctry*Year FE, Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector*Year FE N N N N Y Y Y Y
Table 7. Mechanisms: Selection and Innovation
This table examines the contribution of firm selection to the effects of export demand and import competition on
aggregate productivity at the country-sector-year level. The outcome variable is indicated in the column heading and
described in the text. All columns include country-year pair fixed effects and the full set of controls in Table 3. Columns
5-8 also include sector-year pair fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by sector-year in parentheses. ***, **, *

































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
^Exp Dem (ikt) 1.066*** 0.862*** 0.204*** 0.850*** 0.670*** 0.180*** 1.121*** 0.763*** 0.358*** 0.718*** 0.511*** 0.207*** 1.314*** 1.047*** 0.267***
(0.126) (0.111) (0.037) (0.096) (0.085) (0.031) (0.261) (0.238) (0.063) (0.158) (0.147) (0.040) (0.172) (0.155) (0.045)
^Imp Comp (ikt) -0.113** -0.053 -0.060*** -0.063* -0.013 -0.050*** -0.202** -0.102 -0.100*** -0.108* -0.063 -0.045*** -0.045 0.033 -0.078***
(0.050) (0.044) (0.012) (0.038) (0.034) (0.010) (0.096) (0.089) (0.027) (0.061) (0.055) (0.015) (0.061) (0.055) (0.016)
^Exp Dem (ikt) x -0.476*** -0.405*** -0.070*** -0.302*** -0.252*** -0.050*** -0.218*** -0.143** -0.075*** -0.048** -0.033* -0.015*** -0.769*** -0.636*** -0.133***
Institution (it) (0.067) (0.059) (0.017) (0.042) (0.036) (0.012) (0.069) (0.063) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.005) (0.130) (0.118) (0.032)
^Imp Comp (ikt) x 0.136*** 0.106*** 0.030*** 0.095*** 0.074*** 0.021*** 0.083*** 0.060** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.003 0.085* 0.039 0.046***
Institution (it) (0.031) (0.028) (0.006) (0.020) (0.018) (0.004) (0.027) (0.026) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.046) (0.043) (0.013)
N 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777
R2 0.792 0.835 0.459 0.797 0.839 0.460 0.747 0.802 0.447 0.811 0.848 0.463 0.825 0.858 0.398
Ctry*Year FE, Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 8. Mechanisms: Imperfect Institutions and Market Frictions
Rule of Law Creditor Rights Protection(Inverse) Corruption Labor Market Flexibility
This table examines the role of institutional efficiency in moderating the impact of export demand and import competition on aggregate productivity at the country-sector-year level. The outcome variable and the
measure of institutional efficiency are indicated in the column heading and described in the text. All columns include country-year pair fixed effects and the full set of controls in Table 3. Standard errors clustered
by sector-year in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
(Inverse) Product Market Regulation
Panel A. Country-Sector-Year Level
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
AUSTRIA 2000-2011 178 68 4.29 0.53 4.23 0.52 0.06 0.09 8.06 6.67
BELGIUM 1998-2010 254 709 4.07 0.56 3.87 0.48 0.20 0.17 8.26 6.92
ESTONIA 1998-2011 157 218 1.96 0.58 1.63 0.60 0.33 0.22 4.93 3.70
FINLAND 1999-2011 233 573 4.06 0.56 3.88 0.52 0.18 0.20 7.10 5.65
FRANCE 1998-2009 231 3,559 4.03 0.47 3.85 0.44 0.19 0.15 9.14 8.05
GERMANY 1998-2011 274 721 4.50 0.40 4.39 0.38 0.11 0.09 9.91 8.62
HUNGARY 2003-2011 164 1,484 1.58 0.64 1.06 0.55 0.53 0.31 6.88 5.62
ITALY 2001-2011 218 4,356 3.53 0.43 3.25 0.44 0.28 0.09 9.17 7.75
LITHUANIA 2000-2011 179 263 1.86 0.61 1.38 0.58 0.48 0.23 5.01 4.17
POLAND 2005-2011 128 709 2.30 0.80 2.12 0.79 0.18 0.15 8.12 6.65
PORTUGAL 2006-2011 110 1,637 2.76 0.63 2.48 0.59 0.28 0.12 7.14 6.18
SLOVAKIA 2001-2011 182 109 2.11 0.63 1.97 0.57 0.14 0.20 6.60 5.26
SLOVENIA 1998-2011 232 216 2.30 0.58 2.20 0.54 0.10 0.17 6.06 4.74
SPAIN 1998-2011 271 3,192 3.46 0.44 3.15 0.38 0.31 0.15 8.39 7.42
Mean (across countries) 201 1,272 3.06 0.56 2.82 0.53 0.24 0.17 7.48 6.24





Appendix Table 1. Summary Statistics
This table provides summary statistics for the variation in aggregate productivity (CompNet) and trade activity (WIOD) across country-sector-
year triplets in the 1998-2011 panel, as well as for the variation in institutional and market efficiency (World Justice Project, OECD, World
Bank) across country-years in the 1998-2011 panel.
Years # Sector-Years









Panel B. Country-Year Level
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
AUSTRIA 2000-2011 1.86 0.05 1.92 0.22 3.31 0.12 6.00 0.00 1.39 0.00
BELGIUM 1998-2010 1.29 0.06 1.37 0.08 3.18 0.04 5.00 0.00 1.18 0.00
ESTONIA 1998-2011 0.94 0.23 0.83 0.14 3.71 0.20 6.25 0.00 1.63 0.00
FINLAND 1999-2011 1.94 0.03 2.41 0.13 3.92 0.07 8.00 0.00 1.49 0.00
FRANCE 1998-2009 1.39 0.08 1.37 0.06 3.32 0.05 4.38 0.00 1.11 0.00
GERMANY 1998-2011 1.65 0.06 1.84 0.14 3.05 0.00 7.50 0.00 1.19 0.00
HUNGARY 2003-2011 0.85 0.08 0.48 0.15 3.60 0.00 7.00 0.00 1.03 0.00
ITALY 2001-2011 0.48 0.13 0.31 0.19 2.85 0.00 3.00 0.00 1.23 0.00
LITHUANIA 2000-2011 0.59 0.17 0.17 0.11 5.00 0.00
POLAND 2005-2011 0.52 0.15 0.32 0.12 3.59 0.00 8.38 0.00 0.61 0.00
PORTUGAL 2006-2011 1.01 0.04 1.01 0.05 2.28 0.22 3.00 0.00 1.01 0.00
SLOVAKIA 2001-2011 0.47 0.11 0.28 0.16 3.28 0.10 8.00 0.00 1.11 0.00
SLOVENIA 1998-2011 0.98 0.10 0.94 0.15 3.15 0.02 4.50 0.00 1.11 0.00
SPAIN 1998-2011 1.19 0.09 1.19 0.16 3.25 0.03 6.00 0.00 1.07 0.00
Mean (across countries) 1.08 0.10 1.03 0.13 3.27 0.06 5.86 0.00 1.17 0.00
St Dev (across countries) 0.50 0.05 0.70 0.05 0.41 0.08 1.79 0.00 0.25 0.00
Appendix Table 1. Summary Statistics (cont,)
This table provides summary statistics for the variation in aggregate productivity (CompNet) and trade activity (WIOD) across country-sector-
year triplets in the 1998-2011 panel, as well as for the variation in institutional and market efficiency (World Justice Project, OECD, World
Bank) across country-years in the 1998-2011 panel.

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ Exp Dem (ikt) 0.116*** 0.034 0.082*** 0.142*** 0.053* 0.089*** 0.162*** 0.088*** 0.074***
(0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.018) (0.032) (0.031) (0.019)
Δ Imp Comp (ikt) 0.083*** 0.102*** -0.019 0.062** 0.102*** -0.040** 0.078*** 0.108*** -0.030*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.017) (0.030) (0.027) (0.016)
N 2,546 2,546 2,546 2,073 2,073 2,073 1,587 1,587 1,587
R2 0.114 0.115 0.022 0.101 0.117 0.044 0.096 0.094 0.035
Year FE, Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
This table examines the relationship between aggregate productivity and trade exposure at the country-sector-year level. The
outcome variable is indicated in the column heading and described in the text. All left- and right-hand side variables are first
differences over rolling 1-year, 3-year or 5-year overlapping periods. All columns include year fixed effects and the full set of
controls in Table 3. Standard errors clustered by sector-year in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Appendix Table 2. Trade and Aggregate Productivity: OLS First Differences
Δ = 1 year Δ = 3 years Δ = 5 years











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Only Export Demand
^Exp Dem (ikt) 0.461*** 0.350*** 0.111*** 0.417*** 0.304*** 0.114**
(0.039) (0.041) (0.018) (0.112) (0.097) (0.047)
Panel B. Only Import Competition
^Imp Comp (ikt) 0.148*** 0.149*** -0.001 0.730*** 0.728*** 0.001
(0.013) (0.015) (0.005) (0.150) (0.142) (0.050)
Panel C. Lagged Trade Exposure
^Exp Dem (ikt-1) 0.395*** 0.292*** 0.103*** 0.297*** 0.179* 0.118**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.014) (0.102) (0.092) (0.049)
^Imp Comp (ikt-1) 0.069*** 0.091*** -0.022*** 0.500*** 0.569*** -0.069
(0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.180) (0.163) (0.062)
Panel D. Import Competition Ratio
^Exp Dem (ikt) 0.433*** 0.329*** 0.104*** 0.465*** 0.345*** 0.121**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.013) (0.140) (0.124) (0.058)
^Imp Comp Ratio (ikt) 0.101*** 0.144*** -0.043*** 0.153*** 0.181*** -0.028
(0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.053) (0.047) (0.024)
Panel E. Winsorizing Outliers
^Exp Dem (ikt) 0.393*** 0.301*** 0.092*** 0.206* 0.078 0.127*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.014) (0.120) (0.122) (0.067)
^Imp Comp (ikt) 0.073*** 0.094*** -0.021*** 0.637*** 0.792*** -0.154*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.245) (0.236) (0.087)
Ctry*Year FE, Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector*Year FE N N N Y Y Y
Appendix Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis
This table examines the stability of the impact of export demand and import competition on
aggregate productivity at the country-sector-year level, based on Columns 1-3 and 7-9 in Table 5.
Panels A-B consider only one dimension of trade exposure at a time. Panel C lags trade exposure
by 1 year. Panel D measures import competition with the ratio of imports to domestic turnover.
Panel E winsorizes productivity, trade, and foreign demand and supply instruments at the top and
bottom 1 percentile. Standard errors clustered by sector-year in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at
  
































^Exp Dem (ikt) 1.902*** 1.558*** 0.343** 1.609*** 1.243*** 0.366** -0.530* -1.364*** 0.835*** 0.905* 0.142 0.762*** 1.097*** 0.910*** 0.187***
(0.429) (0.359) (0.152) (0.411) (0.327) (0.156) (0.319) (0.296) (0.287) (0.516) (0.340) (0.293) (0.222) (0.220) (0.065)
^Imp Comp (ikt) -0.873** -0.712** -0.161 -0.859** -0.655** -0.204* 0.369** 0.491*** -0.122 0.179 0.416** -0.237* 0.602*** 0.701*** -0.099*
(0.353) (0.307) (0.104) (0.374) (0.313) (0.121) (0.159) (0.166) (0.101) (0.242) (0.170) (0.139) (0.148) (0.157) (0.055)
^Exp Dem (ikt) x -0.754*** -0.653*** -0.101** -0.510*** -0.422*** -0.088** 0.129 0.310*** -0.180*** -0.068 -0.009 -0.059** -0.683*** -0.602*** -0.082***
Institution (it) (0.148) (0.125) (0.050) (0.109) (0.087) (0.040) (0.081) (0.072) (0.064) (0.045) (0.030) (0.024) (0.135) (0.131) (0.031)
^Imp Comp (ikt) x 0.177*** 0.138*** 0.039*** 0.140*** 0.107*** 0.033*** -0.031 -0.090*** 0.059*** 0.039** 0.017 0.022** 0.085 0.066 0.018
Institution (it) (0.048) (0.042) (0.011) (0.038) (0.031) (0.010) (0.029) (0.028) (0.022) (0.019) (0.013) (0.010) (0.061) (0.060) (0.017)
N 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777
R2 0.727 0.808 0.549 0.731 0.821 0.487 0.896 0.907 0.431 0.840 0.904 0.086 0.856 0.876 0.642
Ctry*Year FE, Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
































^Exp Dem (ikt) 1.121*** 0.763*** 0.358*** 0.611*** 0.482*** 0.129*** 0.376*** 0.204** 0.172*** 0.336 0.069 0.267*** 0.276 0.028 0.248***
(0.261) (0.238) (0.063) (0.072) (0.067) (0.022) (0.095) (0.093) (0.027) (0.275) (0.233) (0.073) (0.223) (0.187) (0.063)
^Imp Comp (ikt) -0.202** -0.102 -0.100*** -0.122*** -0.081*** -0.042*** -0.019 0.022 -0.040** 0.220*** 0.270*** -0.050*** 0.225*** 0.275*** -0.050***
(0.096) (0.089) (0.027) (0.033) (0.031) (0.010) (0.057) (0.055) (0.016) (0.059) (0.051) (0.018) (0.053) (0.046) (0.017)
^Exp Dem (ikt) x -0.218*** -0.143** -0.075*** -0.089*** -0.077*** -0.012** 0.000 0.017 -0.017** 0.014 0.060 -0.046** 0.031 0.071 -0.041**
Institution (it) (0.069) (0.063) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005) (0.017) (0.017) (0.007) (0.071) (0.059) (0.019) (0.056) (0.047) (0.016)
^Imp Comp (ikt) x 0.083*** 0.060** 0.024*** 0.077*** 0.068*** 0.009** 0.025* 0.020 0.005 -0.040*** -0.048*** 0.008* -0.042*** -0.050*** 0.008*
Institution (it) (0.027) (0.026) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.015) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) (0.012) (0.005)
N 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777 2,777
R2 0.747 0.802 0.447 0.758 0.809 0.463 0.752 0.805 0.455 0.748 0.802 0.456 0.748 0.802 0.457
Ctry*Year FE, Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Appendix Table 4. Imperfect Institutions and Market Frictions: Extensions
(Inverse) Product Market RegulationRule of Law (Inverse) Corruption Labor Market Flexibility Creditor Rights Protection
This table examines the stability of the role of institutional efficiency in moderating the impact of export demand and import competition on aggregate productivity at the country-sector-year level. Compared to
Table 8, Panel A adds sector-year pair fixed effects, and Panel B considers different aspects of labor market flexibility. Standard errors clustered by sector-year in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%,
Individual Regular Contracts Temporary Employment Contracts Synthetic Indicator (Regular & Temporary Contracts)
Baseline: Regular Contracts 
(Individual & Collective)
Collective Regular Contracts 
(Additional Provisions)















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
^Exp Dem (ikt) -0.203*** 0.272*** 0.297*** 0.407*** 0.425*** 0.059 0.125 -0.738
(0.069) (0.038) (0.035) (0.138) (0.145) (0.082) (0.155) (0.527)
^Imp Comp (ikt) 0.193*** 0.095*** 0.059*** -0.031 0.408* 0.483*** 0.981*** 2.077***
(0.026) (0.012) (0.013) (0.050) (0.229) (0.131) (0.248) (0.707)
N 2,777 2,777 2,382 2,775 2,777 2,777 2,382 2,775
R2 0.552 0.810 0.784 0.661 0.703 0.872 0.792 0.731
Ctry*Year FE, Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector*Year FE N N N N Y Y Y Y
Appendix Table 5. Trade and MRPK, MRPL, TFPR, Markup Dispersion
This table examines the impact of export demand and import competition on productivity and mark-up dispersion across
firms at the country-sector-year level. The outcome variable is the standard deviation of the marginal revenue product of
capital, the standard deviation of the marginal revenue product of labor, the standard deviation of revenue-based total
factor productivity, or the 90th-10th interpercentile range of the price-cost mark-up as indicated in the column heading. All
columns include country-year pair fixed effects and the full set of controls in Table 3. Columns 5-8 also include sector-year
pair fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by sector-year in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Figure 1A. Welfare Figure 1B. (log) Aggregate Productivity
Figure 1C. (log) Average Productivity Figure 1D. (log) Productivity-Size Covariance
This figure illustrates the relationship between aggregate welfare, measured aggregate productivity, and the misallocation parameters in
numerical model simulations. In each figure, the productivity-distortion correlation ρ(φ,η) varies along the x-axis and the standard deviation
of distortions ση varies along the y-axis. Figures A, B, C and D plot welfare, aggregate productivity, average productivity and the
productivity-size covariance on the z-axis. All other parameter values are described in the text.
Figure 1. Numerical Simulation: Welfare and Measured Aggregate Productivity
Figure 2A. Bilateral Trade Liberalization
(log) Aggregate Productivity (log) Average Productivity Productivity-Size Covariance
Figure 2. Numerical Simulation: Trade Liberalization
This figure displays numerical simulations for the productivity impact of reducing by 20% bilateral trade costs (Figure A) or unilateral export or import costs (Figure B-C). Each line shows how the predicted
change in aggregate productivity, average productivity and the productivity-size covariance on the y-axis varies with the productivity-distortion correlation ρ(φ,η) on the x-axis. Different lines correspond to the
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Figure 2B. Unilateral Export Liberalization
(log) Aggregate Productivity (log) Average Productivity Productivity-Size Covariance
Figure 2C. Unilateral Import Liberalization
(log) Aggregate Productivity (log) Average Productivity Productivity-Size Covariance
Figure 2. Numerical Simulation: Trade Liberalization (cont.)
This figure displays numerical simulations for the productivity impact of reducing by 20% bilateral trade costs (Figure A) or unilateral export or import costs (Figure B-C). Each line shows how the predicted
change in aggregate productivity, average productivity and the productivity-size covariance on the y-axis varies with the productivity-distortion correlation ρ(φ,η) on the x-axis. Different lines correspond to the
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Figure 3A. Growth 2003-2007
Figure 3B. Growth 2008-2011
Figure 3. Sources of Productivity Growth
This figure displays the variation in the 3-year growth rate of aggregate productivity across countries in
the panel. Each bar averages overlapping 3-year growth rates across sectors and years within a






















Ln avg labor productivity (ikt) Covariance term (ikt)
This figure displays the evolution of export and import activity in the panel. Each point represents an average value
across countries and sectors in a given year. Each trade flow series is normalized to 1 in year 2000. Figure A
covers all countries, while Figures B and C distinguish between EU-15 countries and new EU member states. 





















































































































Figure 5. Trade Exposure and Aggregate Productivity
These bin scatters display the raw correlation of aggregate productivity with export and import activity across 100 bins in the panel.
Each point represents average values across country-sector-year triplets within a percentile bin, after demeaning by country-year fixed
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This Appendix complements Section 2 Theoretical Framework in the main paper. It provides a
more detailed exposition of the model and formal proofs for all lemmas and propositions, but moves
quickly over standard theoretical features discussed in the main paper.
Appendix Section 1 corresponds to Sections 2.1 and 2.2 in the paper. It introduces three model
set-ups (e¢ cient allocation and exible wages, e¢ cient allocation and xed wages, and resource mis-
allocation), derives rmsoptimal behavior, describes the general equilibrium, and proves Lemma 1.
Appendix Section 2 corresponds to Section 2.3 in the paper. It develops a mapping between theoretical
concepts and empirical measures of productivity and welfare, and proves Lemma 2. Appendix Section
3 corresponds to Section 2.4 in the paper. It examines the impact of trade liberalization, and proves
Propositions 1-3.
Antoine Berthou: antoine.berthou@banque-france.fr. John Jong-Hyun Chung: jhc0054@auburn.edu. Kalina Manova
(corresponding author): k.manova@ucl.ac.uk. Charlote Sandoz Dit Bragard: charl.sandoz@gmail.com.
1 Theoretical Framework: Three Model Set-ups
This section characterizes rm behavior and the general equilibrium in three versions of a heterogeneous-
rm trade model with two countries.
The rst subsection considers a single-sector model with optimal resource allocation, in which trade
balance holds at the equilibrium and wages adjust in response to trade shocks. This set-up has been
analyzed by Melitz (2003), Arkolakis et al (2012), and Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2013), among
others.
The second subsection examines a two-sector model with optimal resource allocation, in which one
sector produces a freely-traded, constant-returns-to-scale homogeneous good that xes the wage.1 This
environment has been studied by Chaney (2008) and Demidova (2008).
The third subsection presents a model with resource misallocation, where rm-specic "wedges" lead
rms to deviate from the socially optimal levels of production and exporting. This approach to modeling
misallocation in the macro literature follows Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Bartelsman et al (2013).
1.1 E¢ cient allocation and exible wages
1.1.1 Set up and rm behavior
Country j has a mass Lj of consumers with CES preferences and utility









j is the set of varieties available in country j, qj(z) is the quantity of variety z consumed there,
and   1=(1  ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties.
Country i has a mass of rms Mi that use labor to produce horizontally di¤erentiated varieties.






;  >    1; 'mi > 0: (1.2)
A rm in country i with productivity ' needs to use lij(q;') units of domestic labor to produce and
deliver q units to market j, where




Here, fij > 0 represents the xed overhead cost associated with sales to market j in units of labor, and
 ij  1 represents the iceberg cost associated with delivery from i to j, with the normalization  ii = 1.
Each consumer provides a unit of labor inelastically.
The market is characterized by monopolistic competition with free entry. Firmsprot maximization
problem can be separately solved for each destination. Prots from sales to market j are
ij(') = max
p;q
pq   wilij(q;') (1.4)
1Since mark-ups will be 0 in the homogenous-good sector and positive in the di¤erentiated-good sector, there is in
principle a sub-optimal allocation of market shares across sectors. We abstract away from this dimension of misallocation
to focus on distortions in the allocation of productive resources across heterogeneous rms in the di¤erentiated sector.
1
where qj(z) = EjP  1j pj(z)







is the consumer price index in country j, and wi is the wage rate in
























Since prots are monotonically increasing in productivity, rms in country i sell in market j only if
their productivity exceeds a certain threshold but not if ij(') < 0.
1.1.2 Equilibrium
Dene the equilibrium as the set of cuto¤ productivity levels f'ijg, mass of rms fMig, wages fwig, price
indices fPig, and expenditures fEig that satisfy a system of equilibirum conditions for the zero-prot
productivity cut-o¤, labor market clearing, free entry, price index, and income-expenditure balance.
The zero prot condition states that a rm with productivity ' in country i serves market j if and






















i , where Ei[] is the expectation operator and I() is the indicator
function. Under Pareto distributed productivity, this condition can be expressed as:
fEi =
   1

















. Under Pareto, this condition simplies to:
Li =















where the second equality holds under the free entry condition (1.6). In particular, the mass of entrants










Since all rms with productivity ' charge the same price to a given destination, the consumer price in-








Under Pareto, this becomes:
P 1 j =











Finally, the income-expenditure balance requires that aggregate consumer expenditure equal aggre-
gate earnings in each country:
Ej = PjQj = wjLj : (1.10)
Note that this condition implies balanced international trade. To see this, let Xij denote aggregate sales


















wiLi = Ei, where the second equality follows from (1.7) and the last equality follows from (1.10). Since
aggregate expenditure satises Ej =
P






The model does not guarantee 'ii  'ij for all possible parameters. To be consistent with the
empirical evidence of selection into exporting, we restrict the parameter space so that 'ii  'ij holds.
This requires xed and variable export cost to be su¢ ciently high.
1.1.3 Welfare

















where the rst equality follows from the CES aggregation Ei = QiPi, the second equality follows from
the income-expenditure balance (1.10), and the last equality follows from the zero-prot condition (1.5).
A direct implication of (1.12) will be that any trade cost shock that increases the domestic productivity
cut-o¤ 'ii will improve aggregate welfare. Likewise, any trade shock that reduces the expenditure share
on domestic varieties will increase welfare, as ACR (2012) have shown. Since trade balance holds within
the single di¤erentiated-good sector, this will occur both due to trade shocks that increase the share of
exports in total domestic production and due to trade shocks that increase the share of imports in total
domestic consumption.2
2Let k denote country ks expenditure share on domestic goods, which under balanced trade is equal to the share of the






















In other words, any foreign supply or demand shock and any trade cost shock that increases the export sales share (which,
under the model assumptions, must also increase the import consumption share) will improve welfare.
3
1.2 E¢ cient allocation and xed wages
In the single-sector model, a unilateral reduction in export costs has the same e¤ects as a unilateral reduc-
tion in import costs due to the equilibrium condition (1.11) that trade be balanced in the di¤erentiated-
good sector. One way to allow for asymmetric e¤ects is to relax the balanced trade condition by intro-
ducing multiple sectors.
We introduce an "outside" sector that produces freely traded homogeneous goods. A unilateral export
liberalization in the di¤erentiated sector can and will now have opposite e¤ects to a unilateral import
liberalization. Intuitively, when the home country export cost goes down, home exports more. This
increases competition in the foreign country, discouraging entry by foreign rms and reducing foreigns
exports to home. The resulting imbalance between homes imports and exports of di¤erentited goods
can be maintained as the foreign country can specialize in the outside sector.
1.2.1 Set up and rm behavior






where Hj is the quantity of the homogeneous good consumed and Qj is as in (1.1). A unit of labor
produces wi units of the homogeneous good in country i, which is freely traded and chosen as the
numeraire. The labor market is competitive and labor is mobile across sectors, so the wage in country i
is wi. The aggregate price index is now Pi = P

iQ, where PiQ is the di¤erentiated-good sector price index.
The market for di¤erentiated goods is characterized by monopolistic competition with production and
trade technology as before. The rms prot maximization problem therefore delivers the same rst-best
solution as above, adjusted for the share of aggregate expenditure Ej and the price index PiQ relevant

























The equilibrium cuto¤s f'ijg, mass of rms fMig, price indices fPi; PiQg, and aggregate expenditures
fEig are determined by the conditions above for zero cut-o¤ prots (1.5), free entry (1.6), and income-
expenditure balance (1.10), along with a modied expression for the price index:
P 1 jQ =












Note that the earlier labor market clearing condition (1.7) no longer binds and is therefore excluded from
the current equilibrium. In other words, the quantity of labor demanded by the di¤erentiated goods
sector (the right-hand side of (1.7)) is strictly less than the quantity of labor available, Li. The residual
labor is used in the production of the homogeneous good.
The equilibrium conditions here assume imperfect specialization. Under su¢ ciently strong asymme-
try, one country may completely specialize in the di¤erentiated goods sector. In that case the mass of
rms in the other country will be zero, and the specialized countrys cuto¤s and mass of rms will be
determined by the free entry condition and consumersbudget constraint.
1.2.3 Welfare

















Thus 'ii is still a su¢ cient statistic for welfare, and aggregate welfare increases with the domestic
productivity cut-o¤. Unlike the case of the single-sector model above, however, trade balance no longer
holds within the di¤erentiated-good sector. As a result, trade shocks that increase the share of exports
in total domestic production will increase welfare, but the same need not hold for the share of imports
in domestic consumption.3














so that d logWk =   d log 
X
k . However, the trade balance condition no longer holds within the di¤erentiated sector, such
that the share of domestic goods in total domestic consumption is Mk  XkkP
iXik
6= Xk .










Therefore, a unilateral import liberalization in country 1 that reduces f21 or 21 and thus increases a21 will decrease '11
and depress welfare in country 1. On the other hand, a unilateral export liberalization in country 1 that increases a12 will
raise '11 and welfare in country 1, as expected.







A fall in import trade costs  which increases ~a21, decreases ~'11, and increases ~'22  will reduce M1. This loss of domestic
varieties outweighs the gain from foreign varieties and associated price changes, leading to a net decline in welfare.
More generally, one can show that:
Mk =










Hence, any shock that simultaneously increases the import share in consumption Mk and decreases the mass of domestic
entrants Mk will necessarily decrease the domestic cuto¤ 'kk and subsequently welfare.
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1.3 Resource misallocation
We now introduce resource misallocation in the standard heterogeneous-rm trade model. We consider
the case of an outside sector to allow unilateral export and import liberalizations to have asymmetric
e¤ects. The equilibrium of the single-sector alternative can be obtained by adjusting the conditions below
analogously to the adjustments between Sections 1.1 and 1.2 above.
We introduce rm-specic "wedges" that generate deviations from the socially optimal resource allo-
cation across rms. We refer to these wedges as subsidies, but they capture the net e¤ect of all possible
factors that cause a rm to deviate from the rst-best levels of production and exporting. Consequently,
some rms become larger than optimal while others remain smaller than optimal.
1.3.1 Set up
After paying a sunk entry cost of wifEi , each entrant receives two draws, productivity ' > 0 and produc-
tion subsidy/tax  > 0, from a joint distribution Hi('; ). For comparability with the no-misallocation
models, we assume ' is Pareto distributed with scale parameter 'm
i
and shape parameter , which will
imply that the observed distribution of rm sales follows Pareto.
Firmsproduction technology is still characterized by its productivity through (1.3). The subsidy 
a¤ects only the production cost conditional on the amount of labor used, so that the cost to the rm
associated with manufacturing q units is:







This di¤ers from the pre-subsidy cost, i.e. the wage payments received by workers:







The prots of a rm with productivity ' and subsidy  in destination market j are therefore:
ij('; ) = max
p;q
pq   cij(q;'; ): (1.16)
Firmsprot-maximizing quantity, price, revenues, costs and prots are then:

















cij('; )  cij(qij('; );'; ) = rij('; ) + wifij ;







Dene the distorted productivity of a rm as '  '. Note that rm prots depend on rm character-
istics ('; ) through and only through distorted productivity '. In addition, prots are monotonically
increasing in '. This implies that there exists a unique '
ij
dened by ij('ij) = 0, such that all rms
with ' > '
ij














The free entry condition implies that ex ante expected prots equal the sunk cost of entry:
fEi =
   1












Note that (1.17) is equivalent to (1.5) and (1.18) is equivalent to (1.6), with productivity ' in the
no-misallocation case replaced by distorted productivity ' in the misallocation case.
The consumer budget constraint, however, is substantially di¤erent. Assume that subsidies to rms
producing in country i are covered by lump-sum taxation of consumers in i. Aggregate income in country
i is then total labor income less the aggregate cost of all subsidies:
Ei = wiLi   Ti (1.19)
where














The equilibrium cut-o¤ protability levels f'
ij
g and the mass of rms fMig are characterized by
equations (1.17), (1.18), and (1.19).
1.3.3 Welfare
The welfare of country i can be expressed as:





























From (1.20), the aggregate tax Ti and hence i depend on the joint distribution of ('; ), and cannot
be determined from the marginal distribution of ' alone. The aggregate tax Ti may either increase or
decrease in response to a rise in '
ii
even when ' follows Pareto, depending on the joint distribution of
('; ). Moreover, a potential increase in Ti can be su¢ ciently high such that welfare can fall in response
to a rise in '
ii
. This stands in sharp contrast to the no-misallocation model.
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1.4 Proof of Lemma 1
Equations (1.12), (1.14) and (1.21) imply that aggregate welfare is proportional to the productivity cut-
o¤ for domestic production in the absence of misallocation and to the protability cut-o¤ and the share




















The proves Lemma 1 as stated in the paper:
Lemma 1 Without misallocation, welfare increases with the domestic productivity cut-o¤, dWid'ii > 0.




> 0, and with the share of disposable income in gross income (holding '
ii
xed), @Wi@i > 0.
2 From Theory to Empirics
We now consider the relationship between the theoretical concepts of welfare, rm productivity, and
aggregate productivity and their empirical counterparts that can be measured in the data. For the case
of real value added per worker, we establish that the measured aggregate productivity of domestic rms
is proportional to welfare in the absence of misallocation, but not in the presence of misallocation.
2.1 Theoretical and measured rm productivity
In Section 2.3 of the paper, we introduce real value added per worker i(') as the empirical counterpart
to rm productivity in the model '. Observed value added corresponds to total rm revenues from
domestic sales and any exports, ri(') =
P
j rij(')I('  'ij). Observed employment represents the total
amount of labor that a rm hires to produce for home and abroad, li(') =
P
j lij(')I('  'ij). Denoting
labor used towards xed overhead and export costs as fi(') =
P
j fijI('  'ij) and normalizing by the
consumer price index in the di¤erentiated industry PiQ = P
1=
















In Section 2.3 of the paper, we claim that measured productivity i(') is monotonically increasing
in theoretical productivity ' conditional on export status, i.e. 0i('j' < 'ij) > 0 and 0i('j'  'ij) > 0.
From equation (2.1), it is su¢ cient to show that lii(') and lii(') + lij(') are increasing in '. The latter





' 1 and lii(')+lij(') =










' 1, both of which are increasing in '.
In the case of misallocation, there is an analogous relationship between theoretical and observed
distorted productivity, ' = ' and i('; ). Now measured rm productivity is monotonically increasing
8
















2.2 Theoretical and measured aggregate productivity































are a rms share
of aggregate employment.4



























rij('; )I('  'ij)
i : (2.5)
In the case of misallocation, aggregate productivity is adjusted for the ine¢ cient allocation of productive
resources across rms. The scaling factor ~i represents the size-weighted average distortion  to true rm
productivity '. When there is no misallocation,  = 1 for all rms and ~i = 1 drops out.
Since the expression for ~i without misallocation follows directly from that with misallocation, we
derive it explicitly for the case of misallocation. The derivation for the case without misallocation is
equivalent after replacing ' with '.






















wifij , wilij('; ) =  1 rij('; ) + fij , and ' is distributed Pareto with

















































rij('; )I('  'ij)
i
:
4 In the data, the rm weights are dened such that they sum to 1 across rms. Here, i(') and i('; ) are dened
such that they average 1 across rms. This ensures that the residual in the OP decomposition is the covariance of rms
measured productivity and employment share.
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Rearranging delivers expression (2.4) for aggregate measured productivity ~i.
2.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2 in the paper states:








This lemma follows directly from Lemma 1 and equations (1.22) and (2.4).
3 Trade Liberalization
In this section, we examine the e¤ects of trade liberalization on welfare and aggregate measured produc-
tivity in the three model scenarios introduced above. Both import and export liberalization improve a
countrys welfare and aggregate productivity in a one-sector frictionless economy. In a two-sector friction-
less economy by contrast, bilateral and export liberalizations increase welfare and aggregate productivity,
while unilateral import liberalization acts in reverse due to a delocation e¤ect. In the presence of resource
misallocation, all three types of trade liberalization have ambiguous e¤ects.
3.1 E¢ cient allocation and exible wages: Proof of Proposition 1
Section 2.4.1 in the paper examines the impact of trade liberalization in the case of e¢ cient resource
allocation and no outside sector ( = 1). Its results are summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under no misallocation and exible wages ( = 1), bilateral and unilateral trade liber-
alizations (i.e. reduction in  ij,  ji, or both  ij and  ji) increase welfare Wi and measured aggregate
productivity ~i, but have ambiguous e¤ects on average productivity i and covariance
::
i.
Proof. The proof of this proposition builds on an intermediate result summarized in the following lemma:
Appendix Lemma 1 Under no misallocation and exible wages ( = 1), a reduction in the export
cost 12 or in the import cost 21 increases the domestic productivity cut-o¤ '11.
Equilibrium conditions (2.11), (2.12), (2.13), and (2.14) in the paper can be expressed in terms of
the model parameters and endogenous variables f'11; '12; '21; '22;M1;M2; w1; w2g with the following
10










































































Let country 2s labor be the numeraire, such that w2 = 1. The mass of entrants can be determined
directly from the labor market clearing conditions (3.3) and (3.4). From the free entry conditions (3.5)
and (3.6), 'ii can be expressed as a function of 'ij , denoted 'ii = hii('ij). From the zero cut-o¤
prot conditions (3.1) and (3.2), 'ij can in turn be written as a function of 'jj and w1, denoted 'ij =












































On the other hand, equation (3.7) implies a negative relationship between '12 and w1.












































The left hand side of this equation is decreasing in '21 because  >   1 and  > 1 by assumption. The





in opposite directions. Therefore, '12 and '

21 move in the same direction. Condition (3.1) then implies









opposite directions but '12 and '






decrease while '11 increases.
11
Therefore, equations (3.2) and (3.7) determine the unique equilibrium ('12; w1), as illustrated in
Appendix Figure 1.
We next examine the impact of trade liberalization by showing that a reduction in the bilateral trade
cost 21 decreases '12. From the perspective of country 1, this corresponds to an import liberalization.
Recall from the free entry condition (3.5) that the productivity cut-o¤s for production and for exporting,
'11 and '

12, move in opposite directions. An import reform that reduces the export cut-o¤ '

12 would
thus increase productivity cut-o¤ '11.
From the perspective of country 2, a fall in 21 corresponds to an export liberalization. If '12 decreases




21 move in the same direction as argued above. Given the free
entry condition (3.6), an export reform would then raise productivity cut-o¤ '22.
We illustrate the e¤ect of a reduction in 21 in Appendix Figure 1. This trade cost shock shifts
both curves downward. To see this, consider rst the curve associated with (3.2). Holding '12 xed,











22. So if 21 falls, '

22 must increase and '

21 must decrease. From
equation (3.2), w1 would then fall.
Consider next the curve associated with (3.7). Holding w1 xed, we now show that '

12 would decrease
if 21 falls. Since '12 and '

21 move in the same direction, it is su¢ cient to show that '

21 must fall. By
way of contradiction, suppose '21 were to increase. Then (3.1) implies that '

11 would rise as well. In
turn, (3.5) implies that '12 would decrease. But then '

21 would have to fall as well, contradicting the
initial assumption.
Since both curves shift down with a reduction in 21, the wage w1 must fall. One can further establish
that '12 must also fall. Suppose by way of contradiction that '

12 were to rise. Then from (3.2), '

22
would have to increase, and from (3.6) '21 would in turn have to fall. This would, however, violate the
result above that '12 and '

21 must move in the same direction.
This completes the proof of Appendix Lemma 1.
Equation (2.20) in the paper shows that welfare Wi is proportional to the domestic productivity cut-
o¤ 'ii, where the scaling constant is invariant to trade costs. Equations (2.20) and (2.25) in the paper
imply that measured aggregate productivity ~i is proportional to welfare, where the scaling constant is
a function of  and  alone. The resutls for Wi and ~i in Proposition 1 therefore follow directly from
Appendix Lemma 1.
Unlike Wi and ~i, average productivity i and covariance
::
i do not have closed-form analytical
solutions in terms of trade costs or productivity cut-o¤s. However, numerical exercises indicate that they
can either rise or fall in response to each trade reform considered at di¤erent segments of the parameter
space. This supports the ambiguous predictions in Proposition 1.
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3.2 E¢ cient allocation and xed wages: Proof of Proposition 2
Section 2.4.1 in the paper examines the impact of trade liberalization in the case of e¢ cient resource
allocation and an outside sector ( < 1). Its results are summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Under no misallocation and xed wages ( < 1), bilateral and unilateral export liberal-
izations (i.e. reduction in  ij or both  ij and  ji) increase welfare Wi and measured aggregate productivity
~i, but have ambiguous e¤ects on average productivity i and covariance
::
i. Unilateral import liberal-
ization (i.e. reduction in  ji) reduces Wi and ~i, but has ambiguous e¤ects on i and
::
i.
Proof. The proof of this proposition builds on an intermediate result summarized in the following lemma:
Appendix Lemma 2 Under no misallocation and xed wages ( < 1), a reduction in the export
cost 12 or in bilateral trade costs 12 and 21 increases the domestic productivity cut-o¤ '11, while a
reduction in the import cost 21 decreases '11.
Since wages are xed, the productivity cut-o¤s can be determined from the zero cut-o¤ prots and























 ; where ~fEi 
   (   1)





  and aij  fijd ij :
Note that aij measures trade opennness in that it is decreasing in fij and  ij .
The equilibrium domestic productivity cut-o¤s can be determined from:
' d = A
 1 ~fE ;
where ' d is the vector of ('

ii)
 , A is the square matrix of aij , and ~fE is the vector of ~fEi . We assume
A is nonsingular to ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium.










Clearly, a unilateral import liberalization in country 1 that reduces 21 and thus increases a21 will
decrease the domestic productivity cut-o¤ '11.
Conversely, a unilateral export liberalization in country 1 that reduces 12 and thus increases a12 will
likewise raise '11. Taking the derivative of '
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Finally, a bilateral trade liberalization between two symmetric countries ('11 = '

22; a11 = a22 =
ad; a12 = a21 = at) would raise the productivity cut-o¤s in both countries. To see this, note that a
bilateral reduction in 12 = 12 =  would lower the export cut-o¤s in both countries, and thereby raise








which is clearly increasing in at and hence decreasing in  .
Equation (2.20) in the paper shows that welfare Wi is proportional to the domestic productivity
cut-o¤ 'ii, where the scaling constant is invariant to trade costs. Equation (2.25) in the paper shows
that aggregate measured productivity ~i is proportional to P
 1=
i . Since welfare is proportional to 1=Pi,
aggregate productivity must move in the same direction as welfare in response to trade liberalization.
The resutls for Wi and ~i in Proposition 2 therefore follow directly from Appendix Lemma 2. As in
Proposition 1, the ambiguous predictions for average productivity i and covariance
::
i in Proposition 2
are based on their varying response to trade reforms in numerical simulations with di¤erent parameter
values.
3.3 Resource misallocation: Proof of Proposition 3
Section 2.4.2 in the paper examines the impact of trade liberalization in the case of resource misallocation.
Its results are summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Under resource misallocation, bilateral and unilateral trade liberalization (i.e. reductions
in  ij,  ji, or both  ij and  ji) have ambiguous e¤ects on welfare Wi, measured aggregate productivity
~i, average productivity i, and covariance
::
i.
Proof. To prove this proposition, it is su¢ cient to show that there exists some joint distribution Hi('; )
and model parameters such that a given trade cost shock can either increase or reduce welfare Wi and
aggregate productivity ~i.
Note from equation (1.21) that welfareWi depends on trade costs  ij and  ji only through their e¤ect
on the distorted productivity cut-o¤ for domestic production '
ii
and the share of disposable income i;





Consider the following Hi('; ) special case. Firms rst draw distorted productivity ' from the
Pareto distribution (1.2). Then rms with ' 2 [  "; ] are assigned  =  > 1, while all other rms are
assigned  = 1. True rm productivity is given by ' =
'
 .
The total lump-sum tax on consumers can be expressed as the sum of the subsidies provided for the
domestic and export sales of subsidized rms, Ti =
P
j Tij , where:
Tij 
(   1)











Consider two scenarios. Assume rst that other model paramaters and initial trade costs are such
that '1
ii
<   " <  < '1
ij
. Then only some domestic producers but no exporters would be subsidized,
and T 1i = T
1
ii. Suppose that a trade cost shock pushes down the export cut-o¤ and consequently raises




<    " after the shock. Now some exporters would receive




ij . This shows that a marginal reduction in '

ij
from  to   " can generate
a discrete rise in Ti when  is su¢ ciently large relative to ". The concurrent change in 'ii and M1,
however, would be continuous. Therefore, such a trade shock would trigger a discrete drop in i but a
marginal rise in '
ii
, leading to a fall in aggregate welfare Wi.
Intuitively, this sample economy subsidizes a small set of rms, that become larger than socially
optimal while all other rms remain smaller than optimal due to general equilibrium forces. Trade
liberalization can exacerbate this misallocation when it allows rms that are already too large to become
even larger by accessing the foreign market, while rms that are already too small become even smaller
or exit. This loss due to increased misallocation can outweigh the benets of trade liberalization and
reduce overall welfare.
Assume next that model parameters and initial trade costs are such that '1
ii
<    " <  < '1
ij
.
Suppose that a trade cost shock pushes down the export cut-o¤ and consequently raises the production
cut-o¤, such that '2
ii
<    " <  < '2
ij
continues to hold after the shock. Now a subset of domestic
producers and no exporters would receive subsidies both before and after the shock, and the total value







marginal reduction in '
ij
would generate a marginal fall in Ti and a marginal rise in 'ii. Such a trade
shock would thus increase aggregate welfare Wi.
A similar argument applies to aggregate productivity ~i. The e¤ects of trade cost shocks ~i can
be assessed based on equation (2.4). In the rst scenario above for example, the sales-weighted average
subsidy rate ~i would increase discretely when the export cut-o¤ '

ij
falls below    ". The consumer
price index Pi, however, would decrease continuously in 'ii. Therefore,
~i would fall if  is su¢ ciently
large. Conversely, ~ would rise in the latter scenario.
As in the absence of misallocation, average productivity i and covariance
::
i under misallocation do
not receive closed-form analytical solutions in terms of trade costs or productivity cut-o¤s. Unlike the
case of e¢ cient allocation, the e¤ects of trade reforms on Wi and ~i are ambiguous with distortions. It












Note: The diagram illustrates the relationship between country 1’s wage w1 and export cutoff
ϕ∗12 as given by zero cutoff profit condition (3.2) and the balanced trade condition (3.7). The
equilibrium level of (w1,ϕ∗12) is determined at the intersection of the two curves. The dashed
lines show the shift in the relationships due to a reduction in import cost τ21, which reduces the
equilibrium wage w1 and the export cutoff ϕ∗12.
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